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a b s t r a c t 
In times of crisis, innovation and entrepreneurship can be considered as a path out of val- 
uation uncertainty of firms. All types of innovation output, however, may not have a sim- 
ilar impact across different firm size and sectors during bad times. Specifically, financially 
less-constrained (high leverage) innovative firms could be valued higher or experience less 
uncertainty in their performance. By considering the innovation intensity and leverage in 
pre- and post-2008 financial crisis periods, and using firm-level quarterly data from listed 
firms in the UK during 20 0 0–2014, we find that leveraged firms can achieve greater valua- 
tion and mitigate any valuation uncertainty in the post-crisis period if they are knowledge- 
or high-technology intensive. In terms of size effect, although leverage distorts market val- 
uation of large UK firms, the impact is positive for SMEs that are innovation intensive. 
Finally, in terms of sectoral effect, firms within manufacturing and services with leverage 
have benefitted from R&D and patenting activities during the post-crisis period, but not in 
the pre-crisis period. This also gets revealed when we classify all firms into high-tech and 
low-tech sectors, implying that firms in the high-tech sectors with debt dependence have 
benefitted favorably in terms of higher valuation and lower uncertainty in the post-crisis 
period, not firms in the low-technology sectors, reflecting further the role of technological 
intensity in firm valuation. 
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
Although the earlier literature has focused on the knowledge stocks such as R&D and patents in analyzing firm valuation
(see for instance Hall (2011) and Hall et al. (2013 , 2010 , 2007) ), trademarks were rarely used in evaluating the economic
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 (2011) ). Nevertheless, according to Block et al. (2014) , patents are related to technological aspects, whereas trademarks are
related to marketing services, which make both the innovation output crucial in driving firm valuation. In addition, firms
build reputation and strengthen branding via investments in marketing and advertising assets, which are not officially reg-
istered as intellectual properties (IPs) but form a part of knowledge stock for a company. In that sense, advertising assets
might influence market valuation, which the earlier literature has not incorporated in innovation-market valuation relation-
ship. Moreover, patenting could be costly to some firms, and they may keep their innovations unpatented, and keep those in
the firm’s knowledge stock. Thus, depending on the nature of the industry, firms may accumulate different intellectual cap-
ital (IC) and hence, using patent intensity alone is not always the best proxy to symbolize a firm’s total intellectual capital
stock. 
Even though much of the earlier literature has commonly linked the increases in market valuation of a company to its
innovation activities (see Carosi (2016) ), investments in those activities may get distorted by various factors including firm
size, the industry in which they operate (see Mallick and Sousa (2017) ) and the capital structure of a firm. In that sense,
whether a firm chooses to focus on debt or equity in its capital structure, it may influence the investments channeled
into those innovation activities. While the earlier literature reviews how investment decisions matter in shaping the firm-
level investment behavior ( Peltonen et al. (2012 , 2011) ), financing constraints remain critical for investment in knowledge
capital. In the presence of domestic borrowing constraints ( Serena and Moreno (2016) , Serena and Sousa (2017) , Avdjiev
et al. (2017) ), the literature often has contrasting views on whether financial constraints impede innovation. Some scholars
argue that innovation activities are curtailed during bad times, especially when firms use borrowing to expand or sustain
business activities in such periods. Banks and other lenders prefer physical assets to secure loans and are reluctant to lend
for projects that involve substantial R&D investment. Therefore, as a common practice when a firm is financially constrained,
the first decision a management team takes is to cut extra costs, which may reduce R&D expenses (see Hall (2010) , Hall
and Lerner (2010) , Brown et al. (2012) , Borisova and Brown (2013) ). On the other hand, another stream of the literature
suggests that firms prefer to maintain R&D activities in bad times because they were locked into these activities due to an
initial investment (see Archibugi et al. (2013) ). The question is whether innovation-intensive firms with different debt-equity
structures display differences in their firm valuation; or, whether innovation-intensive firms have higher valuation even if
they are financially constrained (such as SMEs). Despite the market-based equity financing system in the UK, debt finance
remains the dominant form of corporate financing including short-term bank loans (see Dosi (1990) ). 
At a general level, ownership category, production sector, and financing type can influence investment spending and
thereby firm performance. However, previous literature has not yet explored whether these differences contribute to firm
performance in the post-crisis periods. Nemlioglu and Mallick (2017) analyzed the performance of the UK firms and found
that in the post-crisis period, intangibles are only beneficial when combined with greater R&D activity. However, Brown et
al. (2012) point out that, due to reasons such as lack of collateral and asymmetric information, R&D investments may face
significant adverse selection and moral hazard problems, particularly in younger and smaller firms, who are more likely to
be financed by equity than debt. Therefore, by considering the findings of Brown et al. (2012) on small firms, we believe
that firm heterogeneity can matter in the innovation-leverage interaction following the crisis, which we investigate in our
paper. 
In this context, analyzing market valuation at the firm and industry levels is worth investigating, given the financial
constraints in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. Thus, the paper investigates the temporal variation of the
innovation-leverage linkage considering the sectoral and size heterogeneity. As financial constraints tend to impact the de-
cision of innovative activities of firms including different size across sectors, the impact of such constraints is even greater
during times of financial crisis. 
Our research contributes to the literature in many ways. First, we incorporate both advertising and trademark intensi-
ties in addition to the traditionally used patents as innovation output, and R&D as innovation input. Second, we investigate
whether the impact of innovation varies for leveraged companies who tend to utilize leverage in financing innovation activ-
ities and also whether it varies across firm size and industries. Third, the debt structure and intellectual capital intensities
jointly can also help valuation during bad times. As SMEs tend to be more financially constrained, we explore whether
SMEs with higher patent and trademark intensities, in the presence of leverage, perform differently from large firms during
the post-crisis period. Fourth, considering the sectoral heterogeneity (see Pieri et al. (2018) ), we test the role of debt and
innovation on valuation uncertainty, which could be mitigated for high-technology and knowledge-intensive firms. To sum
up, our main research question focuses on whether highly leveraged firms perform better during crisis times if they are
innovation-intensive. 
Our results can be described as follows. First, we find that different types of intellectual capital except trademarks are im-
portant in explaining valuation differences across firms. Focusing on sectoral heterogeneity, while SMEs significantly benefit
from their R&D and patent intensities, large firms tend to derive positive significant benefit from trademarks and adver-
tising intensities. Second, depending on how those firms use their leverage in creating intellectual assets, it would boost
their performance. We find that SMEs, who are more financially constrained, benefit significantly by focusing jointly on R&D
and patents with leverage, even in the post-crisis period. Third, when we consider valuation uncertainty, we find that the
innovation-intensive debt reliant firms are able to lower any valuation uncertainty, even during the post-crisis period. There-
fore, high debt firms should focus on patenting and R&D activities that help alleviate valuation uncertainty in the post-crisis
period. Finally, using an alternative sectoral classification, we find that high-tech firms tend to improve their market valu-
ation or reduce their valuation uncertainty in the post-crisis period using patents and R&D, regardless of their debt level,
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 whereas low tech firms may reduce their valuation uncertainty and achieve better valuation by focusing on trademarks and
marketing assets. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, dividing the literature review into subsec-
tions for each hypothesis. Section 3 presents the data, methodology, and the theoretical model. Section 4 presents empirical
results and robustness checks and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Impact of innovation on market values 
2.1.1. Impact of R&D and patents on market values 
Prior literature has widely focused on R&D intensity and patents to explain the changes in valuation across firms (See
Bloom and Van Reenen (2002) , Hall and MacGarvie (2010) , O’Mahony and Vecchi (2009) , Toivanen et al. (2002) ). Hall et al.
(2007) investigate quality-weighted patents in European firms and find that patents in software and business are consider-
ably more valuable than others, especially if they are taken out in the US. Helmers and Rogers (2011) evaluated the effect of
a firm’s patenting decision on a firm’s growth, using data on all high- and medium-tech start-ups and found that patentees
have higher asset growth than non-patentees of between 8% and 27% per annum. On the other hand, Thomson and Webster
(2013) find that small to medium-size enterprises, highly leveraged firms, and firms with less ability to patent are more
likely to pursue an external R&D strategy (e.g. outsourcing), despite the risks. 
On the other hand, in a cross-country setting, Kim et al. (2012) estimated the impact of intellectual property protection
on firm performance and cross-country growth and found that patentable innovations matter positively and significantly
for firm growth, while utility model innovations contribute to firm performance when firms are technologically lagging and
those innovations can be a learning device and thus a stepping stone for developing more patentable inventions. Gao and
Chou (2015) argue that patent protection plays an important role in firm valuation for globally diversified firms, especially
for those with greater R&D intensity. Similarly also at an aggregate level, Nemlioglu and Mallick (2020) and Nemlioglu
(2019) , uncover that greater IP supported by stronger enforcement leads to higher capital stock. Consistent with evidence
from the prior literature, Chen et al. (2014) also find that stronger patents stimulate R&D in countries with more frequent
innovations; and, to the extent that capital-intensive industries have high fixed innovation costs, stronger patents can stim-
ulate R&D in more capital-intensive industries. Also, high fixed innovation cost tends to require greater patent protection.
Chen et al. (2014) show that when firms’ innovation capability is higher, stronger patent increases innovation at industry-
level. He and Wintoki (2016) , and Carosi (2016) also uncovered that R&D investment explains a significant portion of the
increase in the average liquidity of U.S. firms. The findings of Carosi (2016) reveal that the effect of R&D intensity on the
market to book ratio is larger in firms with more patents and increases with the R&D of local firms. So, in general, the
literature is in favour of the impact of patents and R&D on market values, which leads to the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Patent and R&D have a direct positive impact on the market values of UK firms, but in the post-crisis period the
impact on high-debt firms is positive only when R&D is supported by patenting. 
2.1.2. Impact of trademarks on market values of the UK firms 
Firms are organisations that combine a broad range of different qualities and resources to develop, manufacture, and sell
their products. Besides the tangible assets such as property, plants, and equipment, firms also have intangible assets that
become increasingly important. Although R&D and patents contribute to company values in financial markets, a few studies
such as Bosworth (2001) , Greenhalgh and Rogers (20 06 , 20 07) , Von Graevenitz (2007) , Sandner and Block (2011) , suggest
that other IP assets, such as trademarks, might also have a significant impact on firms’ market values, and they at least
partially reflect their market valuation. One of the advantages of trademarks is that they can capture relevant aspects of
innovation and differentiate brands from their competitors. Additionally, studying trademarks can capture small firms and
start-ups that lack patenting (see Mendonça et al. (2004) ). Von Graevenitz (2007) corroborates the applicability of these
indicators to trademarks, which the stock market values, in addition to R&D, and patents. 
Greenhalgh and Rogers (20 06 , 20 07 , 2012) link the higher stock market values with patent and trademark activities of
firms. It is remarked that there are more significant differences between firms with and without trademarks for services
than for manufacturing. Also, there are significant differences when a service-based firm applies for EU community trade-
marks, rather than just applying for UK trademarks. The most competitive sectors have the lowest market valuation of R&D.
Furthermore, within the most competitive industry (‘science-based’ manufacturing), firms with larger market shares (an in-
verse indicator of competitive pressure) also have higher R&D valuations, as well as some positive return to UK patents. This
evidence supports Schumpeter by finding higher returns for innovation in less than fully competitive markets. Duygun et al.
(2014) find that there is a significant difference in profit efficiency of trademarking and non-trademarking UK banks, while
the differences in cost efficiency are less visible for banks in the UK. Bosworth and Rogers (2001) show that trademarks
have a positive impact on the performance of firms in service industries while other traditionally used intangible assets do
not. 
Block et al. (2015) investigated SMEs and found that trademarks are particularly important for protection, marketing,
and exchange motives, whereas patents signal technological capabilities. Therefore, patents and trademarks refer to differ-
ent aspects of firm innovative activities and there is complementarity between patents and trademarks (see Thoma (2015) ).
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 Therefore, it is vital to include both patents and trademarks as IP measures in the analysis. Block et al. (2014) investigate
the role of trademarks in the valuation of start-up companies by venture capitalist and found that trademarks and company
valuation have an inverted U-shaped relationship, indicating that the impact of trademarks is positive up to a level, but
the impact declines in later stages. This suggests that start-up firms should emphasize their brand strength by trademarks.
Similarly, Helmers and Rogers (2010) also find that UK-based start-ups are more likely to apply for trademarks. A possi-
ble reason is that patents are appropriate for technology-oriented sectors while trademarks are appropriate for low tech
or service firms. That explains why firms in the service industry are less R&D intensive and have fewer or no patents (see
Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2006 ). Zhou et al. (2014) also suggest that trademarks and patents are complementary; more specif-
ically, patents signal technological capabilities while trademarks signal marketing capabilities. Block et al. (2015) investigated
the economic impact of trademark filings in SMEs and found that trademarks are particularly important for protection, mar-
keting and exchange motives. These motives have different impacts on different clusters of SMEs. Therefore, we focus both
on large and small firms. Our hypothesis is built upon this argument as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Trademark intensity has a direct positive impact on the market valuation of large UK firms, but in the 
post-crisis period, the impact only becomes positive for the firms with high leverage (less credit-constrained). 
2.1.3. Impact of advertising assets on market values of the UK firms 
Firms build reputations and strengthen their image which is embedded in a firm’s knowledge stock such as trade secrets,
customer relations, networks, marketing, and advertising strategies. In that sense, advertising assets, which signal the brand-
ing and position of the firm within a market should have a significant impact on market valuation. These assets are different
from trademarks, which are not part of formally registered IPs. Strategic and market-related knowledge plays an important
role in successful innovation as well as technical knowledge. Contrary to the majority of the earlier literature, Roper and
Hewitt-Dundas (2015) found that the existing knowledge stocks (represented by patents, R&D, and patents per employee)
have weak negative impacts on firms’ innovation output. And they also found that the effect of existing knowledge stocks
is dominated by new knowledge flows in innovation performance. The adverse effect of existing knowledge stocks might
be due to the negative path-dependency, meaning that firms are locked into existing research fields due to their already
accumulated knowledge in these specific areas. 
Heger and Zaby (2013) analysed the observed heterogeneity of patenting propensity of firms and found that the high
costs of disclosure may outweigh the merits of patenting, leading innovators to rely on alternative protection strategies,
such as secrecy. Similarly, Hall et al. (2013) find that among the firms conducting R&D, only 4% of them apply for patents.
De Rassenfosse et al. (2016) also find that patents are not superior to other means of enhancing disclosure. So, this implies
that patents are critical, but many inventions are not disclosed via patenting. Therefore, it is essential to use other knowl-
edge stocks in addition to patents while exploring the innovation-firm performance relation. Sandner and Block (2011) , by
entering trademarks into the market value equation as a ratio of marketing assets, showed that the impact on market val-
uation is positive. Block et al. (2014) suggest that potential future improvement would be to add advertising spending or
marketing expenditures. 
Therefore, we aim to address this gap in the literature and incorporate trademarks and marketing assets separately by
calculating their intensity (as a ratio over total assets) . Even though trademarks explain the valuation movements up to
a degree, they alone do not capture all advertising and branding benefits especially in SMEs or start-ups. Therefore, our
research is novel in contributing to the existing literature as we incorporate advertising and branding as well as trademarks
and patents. Kim et al. (2016) use advertising intensity as a control variable in identifying the relation between patent
timing and innovation performance. This is parallel to our view that firms accumulate knowledge through advertising and
marketing intensity. On the other hand, Hasan and Cheung (2018) used the term organizational capital, measured it by using
general and administrative (SG&A) expenses and found that firms with higher organisational capital are more likely to be in
the introduction and decline stages than growth or maturity stages. Also, Kim et al. (2016) find that knowledge accumulation
follows the Schumpeterian pattern of creative destruction as found in earlier studies ( Agarwal and Shah, 2014 ; Breschi et
al., 20 0 0 ). Similar to Nemlioglu and Mallick (2017) , we argue that firms with innovative activities perform better even in
the presence of high leverage, in the post-crisis period. Following the literature, we hypothesise that firms with higher
advertising intensity benefit more in terms of market valuation, even with higher debt. Above discussions lead us to the
next hypothesis as shown below. 
Hypothesis 3: Advertising intensity has an indirect positive impact on high-debt firms, but in the post-crisis period, the direct 
impact is positive, and the indirect effect is negative for the leveraged firms. 
2.2. The impact of financial constraints and recent financial crisis on innovation-market value relation 
In the literature, innovation activities are found to create substantial performance differences across firms. However, the
question of whether financial constraints impede innovation and firm performance relation is a long-standing issue. Despite
R&D’s critical role in economic growth and its susceptibility to financing difficulties, the results on the studies of how
financing frictions affect R&D, are mixed ( Hall and Lerner (2010) ). When it comes to financing R&D, stock markets are key
to help explain the high R&D-intensities of young publicly-traded firms in countries such as the UK and Sweden (see Brown
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 et al. (2012) ) and for young publicly-traded US firms (see Brown et al. (2009) ; and Brown and Petersen (2009) ). On the other
hand, an earlier study by Bond and van Reenen (2003) finds that neither German firms nor UK firms display a correlation
between the level of R&D and cash flow. Besides, Hall (2010) found that the US and the UK are more sensitive to cash-flow,
whereas European firms are less. So, in principle, the US and the UK firms should be more subject to financing constraints
which is puzzling, as capital markets in the US are at least as developed as those in Europe. Brown et al. (2012) also find
little evidence on the binding feature of financing constraints in European firms. Thus, the impact of leverage on innovation-
firm performance relation has been a long-standing debate on which the literature remains inconclusive. 
One strand of the literature argues that innovation activities are curtailed during bad times. As R&D activities are consid-
ered as an expense, R&D investment can be the first thing to be sacrificed. Lin et al. (2016) find that financial constraint has
an adverse relation with firm performance (also see Mallick & Yang, 2011 ). As opposed to capital investment, R&D invest-
ment is inflexible, therefore, the risk of R&D-intensive firms increases with their financial constraints. Also, R&D spending is
more sensitive to future earnings variability as compared to physical assets (see Li (2011) ). Therefore, a higher risk premium
is required by shareholders of innovative companies ( Lin et al. (2016) ). In summary, many of the early studies agree that
the capital structure of R&D-intensive firms customarily exhibits less leverage than others and therefore more likely to be
financed by equity ( Hall (2002) , Hall et al. (2009) ). Considering this, Borisova and Brown (2013) show that funds from the
sale of fixed assets can support a key intangible investment in firms facing binding financing constraints. Therefore, the first
strand of the literature argues that financial leverage impairs innovation activities in some firms. If financing constraints are
binding for these firms, the country and worldwide R&D levels will be depressed, leading to lower levels of innovation. 
However, Hall (2010) suggests, there is little evidence that the intangible nature of R&D investments alone leads to lower
innovative activity without any additional factor such as a period of financial crisis when the true valuation of intangi-
bles could have little effect on firm performance unless it is combined with R&D (see Nemlioglu and Mallick (2017) ). As per
Guney et al.,(2017) , there is a positive significant relationship between used credit lines and R&D investments, and the effect
of used credit lines on R&D investments is relatively stronger for financially constrained firms, i.e., small and young firms,
than for financially unconstrained firms. Therefore, although the 2008 economic crisis has severely reduced the short-term
willingness of firms to invest in innovation, this reduction has not occurred uniformly, and a few firms even increased their
investment, despite the adverse macroeconomic environment (see studies such as Filippetti and Archibugi (2011) , Archibugi
and Filippetti (2011) and Archibugi et al. (2013) ). Archibugi et al.,(2013) argue that this is due to being locked into R&D
activities as a result of previous commitments and agreements. Interestingly, the crisis has led to a concentration of inno-
vative activities within a small group of fast-growing new firms which were already highly innovative before the crisis. So,
the presence of in-house R&D activity signals a commitment to innovation, which explains increases in innovation expen-
diture during the crisis. Companies pursuing more explorative strategies are better able to cope with the crisis. Filippetti
and Archibugi (2011) find that this persistence can be a result of several factors including firm-specific characteristics—such
as strategies, managerial differences, stage of development, advertisement profits—and technological changes, scientific re-
search, and the nature of innovation. Of course, supply-side of capital namely financial development also matters for a firm’s
capital structure decisions (see Antzoulatos et al. (2016) ). 
On the other hand, Kieschnick and Moussawi (2018) find that a public firm’s capital structure choice also depends on
its governance features. The more power that insiders possess, the less debt that the firm uses as it ages. Czarnitzki and
Kraft (2009) find that while the market for equity capital might exert insufficient control on top managements’ behavior,
this weakness may be mitigated by a suitable degree of debt-financing. As argued by Younge and Tong (2018) , while exec-
utives play an important role in leading firm innovation, they may economize on effort s to innovate when protected from
takeover threats. The negative effect of takeover protection on innovation is weaker for larger firms, where innovation-
related decision-making authority is more likely to be delegated to middle managers, with limited executive involvement.
Additionally, an internal locus of control in a top manager predicts higher revenue and an increased likelihood of undertak-
ing innovations (see Sharma and Tarp, 2018 ). 
At an aggregate level, the governance features such as regulatory environment also matter in a firm’s access to debt fi-
nancing. Government assistance to SMEs in most countries usually focuses on simplifying rules for easier credit access, mar-
ket support, and reducing administrative processes. Also, McNamara et al. (2017) argue that the inefficient capital regulatory
environment may lead to lower debt levels and lower investments by SMEs. Interestingly, Huang and Shang (2019) find that
firms surrounded by more trusting environments have less need to use financial leverage in their capital structure with less
short-term debt. Moreover, larger firms use higher levels of debt, as they are likely to have lower default risks and enjoy
better reputations. Aktas et al. (2015) find that firms converge to their optimal working capital level by adjusting their in-
vestment levels. Xu et al. (2013) find that Chinese firms that face under-investment problem can mitigate this issue if the
firm has stronger political connections or they are more financially constrained. 
In addition to R&D activities, the number of patents can signal appropriability to the market and therefore those firms
are more likely to access external finance (see Guerzoni et al. (2014) , Audretsch et al. (2012) ). In that perspective, small
firms without those assets have difficulty obtaining bank finance and thus seek finance from venture capitalists (VC) ( Cosh
et al., 2009 ). Firms with credit constraints may choose to lease instead of borrowing from a bank for buying fixed assets
and therefore they will be able to allocate more resources to their projects ( Cosci et al., 2013 ). Clausen and Hirth (2016) find
that more intangible-intensive firms have lower leverage. Consistently, Cumming (2005) finds that firms at early stages are
found less likely to be financed with straight debt, convertible debt, or a mixture of debt and common equity whereas
high-tech firms are more likely to be financed with convertible preferred equity. Cumming et al. (2005) also find that VCs
918 I. Nemlioglu and S.K. Mallick / Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 177 (2020) 913–940 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 adjust their investment decisions according to liquidity conditions on IPO exit markets. In times of high liquidity risk in exit
markets, VCs invest proportionately more in new high-tech and early-stage projects with high technology risk to postpone
exit requirements. When exit markets are liquid, venture capitalists rush to exit by investing more in later-stage projects.
Block et al. (2014) suggest that start-up firms should emphasize their marketing aspects via trademarks as well as their
research orientation via patenting to raise VC financing. Tian et al. (2017) find that the impact of openness for innovation
on the access to financial leverage of Chinese firms is mainly driven by private firms or manufacturing firms. 
Following this extensive review of the literature, we find that the impact of leverage on the innovative and less innovative
firms may portray differences in the post-crisis period. In this paper, we aim to address that by incorporating size and
sectoral classifications into our analyses. Some sectors are more innovation-oriented whereas some are less, which may
direct the leverage-firm performance relation. The arguments above lead to the next hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: Leverage has a positive impact on financially constrained SMEs, but in the post-crisis period the impact is positive
only for high-tech and knowledge-intensive firms. 
3. Analytical framework 
3.1. Specification of the theoretical model 
An earlier study by Hall et al. (2007) states that the market value approach is built upon the idea that firms are bundles
of assets (and capabilities) that are difficult to disentangle and to price separately on the market. These assets include
plants and equipment, inventories, knowledge assets, customer networks, brand names, and reputation. The assumption is
that financial markets assign a valuation to the bundle of firms’ assets that is equal to the present discounted value of
their future cash flows. We follow Hall et al. (2005) for approaches to patents and R&D (see Hall and Oriani (2006) for
R&D, and Sandner and Block (2011) for trademarks). Adding trademarks separately and symmetrically to knowledge assets
follows the approach of Hall and Oriani (2006) , who include “other intangible assets” in addition to physical and knowledge
assets. The complementarity between elements of intellectual capital is an important aspect. Similar to Block et al., 2014 and
Thoma, 2015 , Zhou et al. (2014) also suggest that trademarks and patents are complementary, meaning that patents signal
technological capabilities while trademarks signal marketing capabilities. So, patent and trademark pairs lead to a higher
valuation. 
We mainly constructed our theoretical model based on Hall and Oriani (2006) , Hausman et al. (1984) , and Griliches et
al. (1988) . However, our approach differs as follows. In our paper, we include advertising expenditures ( Hirschey (1985) ,
Connolly and Hirschey (1988) , and Block et al. (2014) ) and trademarks ( Bosworth (2001) , Greenhalgh and Rogers (2006 ,
2007 )) in market value equations. The theoretical model can be written as follows: V it is the market value of firm i at
time t , where A it denotes assets, K it denotes knowledge assets, and M it denotes marketing and branding capital (namely,
trademarks and advertising assets). 
V it ( A it , K it , M it ) = q it ( A it + γk K it + γM M it ) σ (1) 
Taking logarithms on both sides of ( 1 ), we get: 
log V it = log q it + σ log A it + σ log 
(
1 + γK K it 
A it 
+ γM M it 
A it 
)
(2) 
If the value function exhibits a constant return to scale, then σ = 1, in that case, logA it can be moved to the left-hand
side of the equation and the model is estimated with the conventional Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. The equation
thus becomes: 
l og Q it = l og 
V it 
A it 
= l og q it + log 
(
1 + γK K it 
A it 
+ γM M it 
A it 
)
+ ε it (3) 
The term logq it in the equation is the intercept term that varies over time and across companies. 
3.1.1. Estimation method of the benchmark model 
The literature does not strictly specify how to enter knowledge assets into the market valuation equation. There are two
common applications. The first one is to assume that the log ( 1 + γK K it A it + γM 
M it 
A it 
) part of the equation can be approximated
with ( γK 
K it 
A it 
+ γM M it A it ) and the equation can be estimated via pooled OLS. However, the second one is noted by Hall et al.
(20 05 , 20 07 ), and Hall and Oriani (2006) , that if the ratio of knowledge assets to physical assets is high, the approximation
becomes inaccurate, therefore estimating the equation via NLLS may be valid (see ( Sandner and Block, 2011 ). Similarly,
Belenzon and Patacconi (2013) used patent stocks in natural logarithm form to examine the relationship between firm value
and patent stocks by using fixed effects estimation adding time and firm fixed effects. Therefore, we use a log-linear model
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 specification and estimate the model using Fixed Effects regressions including time and firm-fixed effects. Furthermore, we
also use Dynamic System GMM estimation which we discuss in the sub-section below. 
3.1.1.1. Addressing Potential Endogeneity with Dynamic GMM Estimation. Arellano and Bond (1991) , Arellano and Bover (1995) ,
and Blundell and Bond (1998) devised dynamic panel estimators that are designed for situations with a dynamic process,
with current realisations of the dependent variable influenced by past ones. This argues against cross-section regressions,
which essentially assume away fixed effects. The idiosyncratic disturbances may have individual-specific patterns of het-
eroskedasticity and serial correlation. Some regressors can be predetermined but not strictly exogenous; that is, indepen-
dent of current disturbances, and some regressors can be influenced by past ones. To reduce the weak correlation problem,
Blundell and Bond (20 0 0) recommend an extended version of difference GMM and a system composed of equations in first
differences and equations in levels, along with the use of system GMM. 
In our estimations, we draw internal instruments from variables’ lags and limited maximum lagged variables to be instru-
mented to lag 3 as we only encounter order 1 serial-correlation. This is to prevent over-identification problem as suggested
by Roodman, 20 09a , 20 09b . There is no specific formula to determine how many instruments are considered as “too many
instruments”. However, empirically, it is reasonable that to prevent overidentification, the number of individuals or groups
must be greater than the number of instruments used. Therefore, restricting the number of instruments could be necessary
for some panels. For that reason, we used y i,t−1 , y i,t−2 and y i,t−3 for lagged variables, and if the data are transformed by dif-
ferencing, they are y i,t−1 , y i,t−2 and y i,t−3 . Following diagnostic tests are conducted to ensure the validity of dynamic
GMM estimations: the Sargan test, Arellano and Bond test, and the Wald Chi-Square test. 
Sargan (1958) test checks for joint validity of the instruments. It investigates the existence of the overidentification of
the model. Besides, as discussed in Roodman (2009b ), the Sargan test is more powerful in detecting this than the Hansen
test. Also, as argued by Roodman (2009a) , the Sargan test is not so vulnerable to the instrument proliferation problem as in
the Hansen test. Therefore, we reported Sargan test results rather than the Hansen test. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) developed the AR test for the autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic disturbance term. To en-
counter that, we conducted the AR (1) and AR (2) tests, and the results showed only order-1 serial correlation due to the
dynamic nature of our model including lagged dependent variable. Finally, the Wald Chi-square test examines the validity
of the model. In all our models we reject the null at less than 1% level; therefore, the coefficients are not simultaneously
equal to zero. In other words, removing the variables from the model causes harm to the fit of that model. 
3.2. Data and descriptive analysis 
We use firm-level quarterly data from nearly 2300 firms traded in the London Stock Exchange between 20 0 0 and 2014
period. The dataset has been taken from the Amadeus database of the Bureau van Dijk. Additionally, we add firm age and
employee number over total assets as control variables. We conduct our analysis using the log-linear form. Similar to Bloom
and Reenen (20 02 , 20 07 , 2010) , Hall et al. (20 05 , 20 07) , and Hall and Oriani (2006) , we use Tobin’s Q ratio as our depen-
dent variable, as the market value of the firm should reflect the expected future return on intangible assets. By using the
specification in Aktas et al. (2015) , Guney et al. (2017) , and Jia (2018) , Tobin’s Q ratio is calculated as the market value of
equity plus total assets minus the book value of equity, divided by book value of total assets. 
In this paper, intellectual capital elements are represented by four proxies: R&D, patent, trademark, and advertising in-
tensity. We use patent intensity as an explanatory variable, which is calculated as total patents over total assets. The ratio
shows the assets generated for each additional unit of patents granted. Here, using the variables in levels could be mis-
leading due to different firm sizes; instead, we use this ratio, which is parallel to the studies such as Hall (20 0 0 , 2010 and
2011) and Hall et al. (20 05 , 20 07 , 20 09 , 2010 , and 2013 ). Another explanatory variable is trademark intensity, which is cal-
culated as the total number of trademarks owned cumulatively, divided by the firm’s total assets. This is to see whether a
higher number of trademarks brings any additional value to total assets. Instead, Sandner and Block (2011) used trademarks
and marketing assets to construct TM/MA ratio and used the term “marketing assets” to refer to the difference between total
assets and R&D stock. However, we use a common comparable approach for trademarks and advertising assets separately
by calculating trademark intensity as TM/assets, and advertising intensity as SGA/assets (see Hasan and Cheung (2018) ). The
reason for choosing the SGA expenses is that these costs are outside of R&D, but still give a firm the ability to differentiate
its knowledge stocks, including brands, and marketing positions. More specifically, these expenses cover salaries, advertising,
and promotional materials, marketing, and sales expenses. Following Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) , Lev et al.,(2009) , and
Hasan and Cheung (2018) , we capitalized the SGA expenses using a perpetual inventory method. By creating a ratio of SGA
stocks over total assets, we estimate the total assets gained for each additional unit of marketing assets. The underlying
idea is similar to the one in R&D intensity. Following the earlier literature, R&D and advertising expenses, which are both
expenses on a firm’s balance sheet, are accumulated by using a depreciation rate of 15%. R&D stocks are denoted by Rstock,
and Advertising Stocks are denoted by Mstock and are calculated as follows: 
Rstoc k t = Rflo w t + ( 1 − δr ) Rstoc k t−1 and, 
Mstoc k t = Mflo w t + ( 1 − δm ) Mstoc k t−1 
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 The financial constraints are incorporated by using debt ratio into the models. The literature suggests numerous ways of
calculating the leverage ratio. By following Huang and Shang (2019) , Jia (2018) , Guney et al. (2017) , we calculate the debt
ratio by dividing long-term debt to total assets. The ratio provides a general measure of the financial position of a company,
including its ability to meet financial requirements for outstanding loans. An annual decrease in this ratio suggests that a
company is progressively becoming less dependent on debt for its growth. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics based on firm sizes. The first panel in Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics
for all firms; SMEs and large firms. Panel 1 shows that SMEs are more innovation-intensive with higher TM, patent, and
advertising intensities, along with higher debt ratio, whereas the large firms have higher advertising expenses, a higher
number of patents, and trademarks in their portfolios, which are divided by total assets of each firm to overcome potential
scaling issues. Also, SMEs need external financing to finance their operational activities and boost their performance. As
we will investigate further, higher debt will help firms to become less-credit constrained and thus, help them benefit from
innovation by generating innovative assets (see Appendix A for further discussions). Fig. 1 presents the scatter plots of
innovation variables with Tobin’s Q. The graphs on the left column represent high intellectual capital-intensive firms (namely
firms above the mean) whereas the right column represents low intellectual capital-intensive firms (firms below the mean).
From the first set of plots, it is seen that the impact of TM on Tobin’s Q is higher for high TM firms. The second set of
plots represents high and low patent firms across Tobin’s Q. The plots indicate that high patent-intensive firms have higher
valuation than low patent-intensive firms, with a flatter trend in the latter suggesting a lower impact. From the third set of
plots, it is seen that R&D intensity has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q in both high and low R&D intensive firms. However,
for the high R&D intensive firms, the relationship is positive up to a threshold after which it starts declining. Same inverse
U-shaped pattern is also true for the fourth set containing advertising intensity. This suggests that there is an optimal level
for both R&D and advertising intensity and after that firms no longer benefit. Fig. 2 presents 3 scatter plots showing the
Tobin’s Q ratio against debt ratio. The first plot shows high leveraged firms whereas the second one shows low leveraged
firms and the third one shows all sample. The figure indicates that the impact of debt on Tobin’s Q is positive on all graphs.
But the impact of debt on Tobin’s Q is exponential, showing that at lower levels of debt the impact on Tobin’s Q is higher,
and with an increase in debt, the valuation starts to slow down for high debt firms. For low debt firms, the impact is
positive at lower ends and then remains constant. (See Appendices C and D for further details) 
4. Empirical results and discussions 
4.1. Benchmark analysis: testing the existence of a structural break in the valuation of the UK firms in the pre- and post-crisis 
periods 
The benchmark results in Table 2 below show that R&D, patent and advertising intensities directly drive market valuation
upwards while the impact of trademarks is found to be negative for all UK firms. So, the preliminary results demonstrate
that all firms do not benefit equally from intellectual assets, which therefore needs further examination. It is expected
that small firms and large firms have different levels of innovative assets. Therefore, they would benefit differently from
innovation- market value relation. In Table 2 (columns 7 and 8), we separate our sample into SMEs and large firms. Our
findings in the 7 th column are in line with Zhou et al. (2014) , who argue that patents are essential for the performance of
SMEs. So, we find that SMEs benefit from patenting. Conversely, in column 8 we find that trademarks play an important role
for large firms in market valuation whereas it is negative for SMEs. Advertising stocks play a positive role in valuation both
in SMEs and large firms. Overall, it is possible to see that small and large firms benefit differently from innovation output. 
Following the recent global financial crisis, firms made substantial cuts in capital expenses to reduce their vulnerability.
Therefore, it can be suggested that firms which chose to maintain their investment in innovation would benefit, or at least,
would be less prone to crisis. According to Archibugi et al. (2013) , the 2008 economic crisis has severely reduced the short-
term willingness to invest in innovation. However, this reduction has not occurred uniformly, and a few firms even increased
their investment, despite the adverse macroeconomic environment. When the drivers of innovation investment before and
during the crisis were examined, it was found that the crisis led to a concentration of innovative activities within a small
group of fast-growing new firms, and those firms were already highly innovative before the crisis. Companies pursuing
more explorative strategies towards new product and market developments are better able to cope with the crisis. After an
extensive review of the literature on debt and financial constraints, we find that the direct and indirect effects of leverage
can be different for innovative firms during the pre- and post-crisis periods. In this paper, we aim to address this issue
by looking into pre- and post-crisis and by incorporating the joint impact of debt and IC elements into our analyses. The
impact of leverage on firm performance will vary if firms have better innovation capabilities. 
Before investigating the impact of innovation and debt on market values across sectors, we first tested our data for
the existence of a structural break. This is to empirically show whether there is a significant difference between the two
periods investigated (pre-and post-financial crisis). This also helps us to show that the different results in the pre-and post-
financial crisis are driven due to a structural break rather than any selection bias. We ran Zivot-Andrews unit root test for
the structural break and kept maximum lags at 3, parallel to our model specifications, and the results show that indeed the
year 2007 has shown a significant difference and has the minimum critical value. Therefore, this justifies the existence of
a structural break in 2007. Graph 1 below, presents the break drawn from the test. Critical values regarding the results of
these tests can be found in Appendix E . 
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Table 1 
Data description and descriptive statistics 
Panel 1: Data Description based on firm size 
Variable Label All Firms SMEs (with less than 250 employees) Large Enterprises 
Obs Mean Std.Dev Min. Max Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Tobinsq MV/totalassets 137538 1.56 2.02 0.042 49.81 52279 1.94 2.89 0.06 49.80 84279 1.32 1.10 0.04 38.78 
RnDintensity RnDstock/totalAssets (millions in €) 52023 0.57 1.39 0 24.14 29293 0.86 1.87 0 34.84 22730 0.23 0.41 0 4.58 
Advertising_intensity stockSGA/TotalAssets (millions in €) 137538 1.99 4.96 0 95.92 58939 2.69 6.12 0 91.89 78599 1.33 3.35 0 95.92 
Patent_intensity PatentTot/TotalAssets (billions in €) 137538 0.027 0.47 0 28.17 58939 0.06 0.69 0 28.17 78599 0.005 0.13 0 12.22 
TM_intensity TMtotal/TotalAssets (billions in €) 137538 0.028 0.23 0 14.08 58939 0.041 0.37 0 14.08 78599 0.006 0.12 0 9.708 
Emp_ratio Emp/TotalAssets (billions in €) 137538 10.06 50.95 0.002 5200 58939 9.22 62.73 0.002 5200 78599 11.21 27.83 0.01 2734.9 
Age Years since company found 137538 21.80 28.36 0 157 58939 15.9 24.32 0 154 58939 23.29 29.10 0 157 
Debtratio TotalDebts/TotalAssets 137538 0.555 1.35 0.0 31.6 68464 0.58 1.05 0.004 31.07 98356 0.52 0.52 0 29.44 
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Fig. 1. Scatter Plots of Innovation and Tobin’s Q 
Note: The eight graphs above present the scatterplots of Tobin’s Q across innovation intensities. The graphs on the left column represent high intellectual 
capital intensive firms (namely above the mean) whereas the right column represents low intellectual capital intensive firms (below the mean). First two 
plots show high and low trademark intensive firms. It is seen that high TM intensive firms have a higher valuation than low TM intensive firms. The impact 
of TM on Tobin’s Q is higher for high TM firms. The second set of plots represents high and low patent firms across Tobin’s Q. The plots indicate that high 
patent-intensive firms have a higher valuation than low patent-intensive firms. The patent intensity and Tobin’s Q relation is positive in both low and high 
patent firms, however the trend is flatter in low patent firms meaning that the impact of patent intensity is lower. The third set of plots represents R&D 
intensity with Tobin’s Q. The plots indicate that R&D intensity has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q in both high and low R&D intensive firms. However, 
high R&D intensive firms portray a different relation with Tobin’s Q showing that the relationship is positive up to a point and after the threshold it starts 
declining, meaning that if the firm has R&D intensity above a certain level, the impact on Tobin’s Q starts declining. The same kind of inverse U shaped 
relation also applies to the fourth set showing Advertising intensity across Tobin’s Q. Advertising intensity has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q in both high 
and low advertising intensive firms. However, in high advertising intensive firms, the positive impact of advertising starts declining after a threshold. This 
suggests that there is an optimal level for both R&D and advertising intensity for firms and after that firms no longer benefit. 
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Fig. 2. Scatter Plots of Debt Ratio and Tobin’s Q 
Note: Figure above presents scatter plots of Tobin’s Q against debt ratio. The first plot shows high leveraged firms whereas the second one shows low 
leveraged firms. This indicates that the impact of debt on Tobin’s Q is positive on both graphs. But the impact of debt on Tobin’s Q is exponential, showing 
that at lower levels of debt the impact increases Tobin’s Q higher, and with an increase in debt the increase starts to slow down for high debt firms. The 
third graph represents a scatter plot of debt ratio across Tobin’s Q for full sample, showing the debt-Tobin’s Q relationship as positive for whole sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Following the structural break test, we ran our benchmark regression model for the pre and post-financial crisis periods
to see whether innovation has different im pact across firms in the UK (Columns 9–10). We find that in the pre-crisis period,
all IC stocks have a positive impact on valuation except trademarks whereas in the post-crisis period trademark and R&D
intensity harm valuation. We estimate the following equation in Table 2 as the benchmark. 
logT obins q i,t = α0 + αi + αt + β1 RnDi nten sit y i,t + β2 Pate ntIn t i,t + β3 TMin tens it y i,t 
+ β4 Adve rIn t i,t + β5 Debt Rati o i,t + β6 Empr ati o i,t + β7 Ag e i,t + ε i,t (4)
4.2. Investigating the impact of sectoral heterogeneity on the UK firms in the post-crisis 
We support the view in the literature such as Hall, 2011 , suggesting that the impact of debt on firm performance is
inconclusive, and also not all types of leverage are bad; if it is used to generate intellectual assets, it may have a positive
impact especially for SMEs and start-ups who need external financing. Firms with various forms of innovation output can
access better financing than those with only one type (see Block et al., 2014 ; Block et al., 2015 ; Zhou et al., 2014 ). Start-up
firms should emphasize their marketing aspects via trademarks as well as their research orientation via patenting to raise
external financing and overcome their financial obstacles ( Block et al., 2014 ). Therefore, creating a set of interaction terms
between a firm’s financial leverage and knowledge assets can signal how leverage indirectly impacts firms with higher inno-
vation intensities. Therefore, in Table 3 , from column 2 onwards we added debt interactions to investigate the joint impact
of IC assets and debt on market values. In addition, firms with high R&D intensity may also have high patent intensity but,
not all R&D is granted a patent. Therefore, firms focusing jointly on patenting and R&D need further investigation (see Sena
et al. (2018) ). We used two interaction terms to capture the firms who invest in R&D and have patents jointly and to control
for the indirect effect of the firms with high debt, namely: R&D ∗patent, and R&D ∗patent ∗debt. By considering all the above,
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Table 2 
The impact of IC and debt on Tobin’s Q in the pre-and- post crisis periods 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) SME (8) Large (9) Pre-crisis (10) Post-crisis 
RnD intensity 0.179 ∗∗∗ 0.0742 ∗∗∗ 0.0603 ∗∗∗ 0.0696 ∗∗∗ −0.0158 0.0978 ∗∗∗ −0.0977 ∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.00819] [0.00825] [0.0108] [0.0211] [0.00980] [0.0320] 
Patent intensity 0.019 ∗∗∗ 0.0730 ∗∗∗ 0.0652 ∗∗∗ 0.0700 ∗∗∗ −0.866 ∗∗∗ 0.0367 ∗ 0.209 ∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.0112] [0.0113] [0.0138] [0.120] [0.0214] [0.0185] 
TM intensity 0.056 ∗∗∗ −0.0946 ∗∗∗ −0.0807 ∗∗∗ −0.129 ∗∗∗ 1.067 ∗∗∗ −0.0321 −0.504 ∗∗∗
[0.008] [0.0182] [0.0187] [0.024] [0.113] [0.0371] [0.0534] 
Advertising intensity 0.039 ∗∗∗ 0.0247 ∗∗∗ 0.0190 ∗∗∗ 0.0154 ∗∗∗ 0.0111 ∗∗∗ 0.00719 ∗∗∗ 0.0713 ∗∗∗
[0.0005] [0.0014] [0.0015] [0.0021] [0.00386] [0.00193] [0.0106] 
Debtratio 0.209 ∗∗∗ 0.325 ∗∗∗ −0.0947 ∗∗∗ 0.184 ∗∗∗ 0.229 ∗∗∗
[0.0195] [0.0304] [0.0246] [0.0219] [0.0620] 
Empratio 0.00408 ∗∗∗ 0.0112 ∗∗∗ 0.0325 0.0729 ∗∗∗ 0.0266 
[0.0005] [0.0011] [0.005] [0.0639] [0.0256] 
Age 0.00199 0.106 −0.0755 −0.108 0.191 ∗∗∗
[0.0781] [0.133] [0.0793] [0.0852] [0.0135] 
Constant 0.729 ∗∗∗ 0.477 ∗∗∗ 0.477 ∗∗∗ 0.422 ∗∗∗ 0.738 ∗∗∗ 0.640 0.151 3.321 3.428 −6.042 ∗∗∗
[0.0252] [0.0134] [0.0133] [0.0151] [0.0279] [1.942] [1.224] [2.898] [2.179] [0.436] 
Observations 37444 137371 137371 104711 31,266 31,166 13321 17,845 24,446 6720 
Time-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F statistic 57.98 122.0 122.2 141.8 49.87 50.00 25.09 36.49 54.59 32.04 
F for u_i = 0 94.23 124.8 124.5 107.6 87.25 84.34 60.26 119.0 77.62 99.28 
R 2 0.243 0.0139 0.0138 0.162 0.239 0.150 0.197 0.220 0.186 0.132 
R 2 _adjusted 0.186 0.115 0.115 0.166 0.194 0.198 0.227 0.239 0.207 0.170 
Notes: 1) Standard errors in brackets 2) ∗ p < .10 ∗∗ p < .05 ∗∗∗ p < .01. 3) The dependent variable is log Tobin’s q, and models are estimated with Fixed Effects Estimation by adding time and company-fixed 
effects. 4) SMEs are the companies with less than or equal to 250 employees. 
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Graph 1. Testing the structural break in Tobin’s Q 
Notes: Above graph presents the result of the structural break test, conducted using Zivot- Andrews unit root test. 
As structural break tests need time-series data, we have taken average of Tobin’s Q variable across firms in each year. 
By this, we obtained a single observation for each year and then on this new series we ran Zivot-Andrews test of a unit root. 
In our specification, we allowed breaks and imposed three lags. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 in Table 3 (from column 2 onwards), we estimate the following equation: 
logT obins q i,t = α0 + αi + αt + β1 RnDi nten sit y i,t + β2 Pate ntIn t i,t + β3 TMin tens it y i,t + β4 Adve rIn t i,t 
+ β5 Debt Rati o i,t + β6 Rnd ∗paten t i,t + β7 Debt ∗rnd in t i,t + β8 Debt ∗pat en t i,t + β9 Debt ∗tmin t i,t 
+ β10 Debt ∗adv erin t i,t + β11 Rnd ∗pate nt ∗d eb t i,t + β12 Empr ati o i,t + β13 Ag e i,t + ε i,t 
(5)
Column 3 of table 3 shows the estimates for SMEs and column 4 shows the estimates for large firms. The estimation
using the full sample in the first column shows that the higher debt ratio only brings better firm performance for firms
with higher advertising intensity, while the indirect impact of debt seems to be negative for R&D intensive, patent-intensive
and trademark-intensive firms. Additionally, R&D intensity has a positive impact (Column 2) for all firms and Column 3
for SMEs, while the impact is negative and significant for large firms in column 4. Patents and R&D intensities directly
influence the firm value of small firms positively in column 3. SMEs with debt indirectly benefit from joint R&D and patent
activity whereas patent or R&D activities alone are not enough to boost stock market performance. Large firms differ as
they indirectly tend to get a better market valuation from R&D, patent and trademarking along with debt. However, while
large firms with no debt get better valuation with additional advertising and trademarking, they do not perform better with
additional patenting, or through joint R&D and patenting as they already have enough knowledge stock. 
Those types of differences could exist for all firms, and especially in times of financial crisis. Thus, from column 5 on-
wards we investigate how SMEs and large firms respond to the crisis. SMEs in the pre-crisis period (column 5) benefit
from R&D and patents individually, and jointly if the firm uses debt. In addition, the patenting and marketing intensities
contribute to firm performance in high-leverage firms. However, for firms with higher debt, R&D only indirectly benefits if
supported by patenting. Following the crisis (column 6), this has changed. Focusing on patenting alone reduces firm perfor-
mance if the firm has high leverage. R&D and patents contribute to the performance of small firms with high leverage only
if they are done jointly suggesting that the impact is indirect. Large firms in general benefit from marketing and trademarks
pre-crisis (column 7) and advertising and patenting in the post-crisis (column 8). Also, firms with debt can benefit from
advertising, and focusing on R&D jointly with patenting could benefit firms during the post-crisis times. 
According to the nature of the industry that the firm operates in, some firms, for instance, use more patenting whereas
some prefer to keep inventions in the form of trade secrets. Therefore, it is arguable that the sectoral heterogeneity may
cause differences in innovation-firm performance relation in general, as well as in the post-crisis periods. This leads the
analysis to a sectoral level in Table 4 . We used three-sector classification ( Fisher, 1939 ) and classified them into primary,
secondary and tertiary sectors. The primary sector mainly covers natural resources and raw materials, namely agriculture
and mining. The secondary sector is the production sector and covers manufacturing and EGW construction industries. The
tertiary sector is the services sector including knowledge-intensive ICT sectors, and it covers wholesale, retail, hotels, trans-
portation and telecommunications, finance and real estate, professional, scientific, and technical activities, and health, ed-
ucation, and culture industries. The sectoral classification is kept consistent throughout the paper to prevent repetition;
the terms “primary, secondary, tertiary sectors” and “raw materials, production (manufacturing), services sectors” are used
interchangeably. 
Thus, the sectoral results covering all periods are presented in Table 4 from columns 1-4-7. These results suggest that
the primary sector in general, benefits from patenting, trademarking, and advertising activities, while firms in this category
benefit indirectly from advertising and trademark activities along with debt. The secondary sector firms benefit from R&D,
9
2
6
 
I.
 N
em
lio
g
lu
 a
n
d
 S.K
.
 M
a
llick
 /
 Jo
u
rn
a
l
 o
f
 E
co
n
o
m
ic
 B
eh
a
v
io
r
 a
n
d
 O
rg
a
n
iza
tio
n
 17
7
 (2
0
2
0
)
 9
13
–
9
4
0
 
Table 3 
The impact of IC and leverage Tobin’s Q for different company sizes. 
All sectors Benchmark SIZE SME SME Large Large 
ALL FIRMS (1) ALL (2) All Firms (3) SME (4) LARGE (5) Pre-Crisis (6) Post-Crisis (7) Pre-Crisis (8) Post-Crisis 
RnDintensity 0.0603 ∗∗∗ 0.0484 ∗∗∗ 0.0459 ∗∗∗ −0.0816 ∗∗∗ 0.131 ∗∗∗ 0.0190 0.107 ∗∗ 0.237 ∗∗∗
[0.00825] [0.00772] [0.0103] [0.0264] [0.0185] [0.0203] [0.0426] [0.0513] 
Patent_intensity 0.0652 ∗∗∗ 0.329 ∗∗∗ 0.432 ∗∗∗ −1.686 ∗∗∗ 1.326 ∗∗∗ 0.820 ∗∗∗ 0.266 0.595 ∗∗∗
[0.0113] [0.0456] [0.0571] [0.284] [0.130] [0.137] [0.853] [0.693] 
TM_intensity −0.0807 ∗∗∗ −0.0355 −0.123 ∗∗∗ 0.806 ∗∗∗ −0.0291 −0.175 ∗∗∗ 1.721 ∗∗∗ −0.221 ∗∗∗
[0.0187] [0.0219] [0.0280] [0.155] [0.0747] [0.0663] [0.363] [0.422] 
Advertising_intensity 0.0190 ∗∗∗ 0.0127 ∗∗∗ 0.0153 ∗∗∗ 0.0168 ∗∗∗ −0.0018 0.0446 ∗∗∗ 0.0179 ∗∗∗ 0.0512 ∗
[0.00146] [0.00196] [0.00304] [0.00505] [0.0037] [0.0096] [0.00595] [0.027] 
Debtratio 0.209 ∗∗∗ 0.152 ∗∗∗ 0.341 ∗∗∗ −0.220 ∗∗∗ 0.167 ∗∗ 0.582 ∗∗∗ −0.271 ∗∗∗ −0.0366 
[0.0195] [0.0243] [0.0443] [0.0404] [0.065] [0.0989] [0.0491] [0.103] 
Rndxpatent −0.0540 ∗∗∗ −0.076 ∗∗∗ 1.235 ∗ −0.33 ∗∗∗ −0.533 ∗∗∗ −0.173 ∗∗∗ −0.933 ∗∗∗
[0.00975] [0.0121] [0.847] [0.0245] [0.0514] [0.356] [0.126] 
Debt interactions 
Debtxrndint −0.0274 ∗∗∗ −0.024 ∗∗∗ 0.291 ∗∗∗ 0.00976 −0.0151 −0.0251 −2.400 ∗∗∗
[0.00344] [0.00446] [0.0433] [0.0152] [0.0107] [0.0741] [0.245] 
Debtxpatent −0.125 ∗∗∗ −0.217 ∗∗∗ 1.155 ∗∗∗ 0.794 ∗∗ −0.496 ∗∗∗ 0.118 ∗∗ −0.161 ∗∗∗
[0.0376] [0.0463] [1.453] [0.337] [0.133] [0.521] [0.251] 
Debtxtmint −0.0216 0.111 0.454 ∗∗∗ −0.229 0.319 0.447 −0.516 ∗∗∗
[0.0702] [0.0853] [1.065] [0.267] [0.291] [0.369] [0.184] 
Debtxadvertint 0.0114 ∗∗∗ 0.00420 ∗ −0.0517 ∗∗∗ 0.00576 ∗ −0.003 −0.000634 0.152 ∗
[0.00160] [0.00235] [0.0191] [0.0031] [0.0066] [0.0229] [0.0781] 
Rndxpatentxdebt 0.0412 ∗∗∗ 0.0615 ∗∗∗ −0.590 ∗∗∗ 0.265 ∗∗∗ 0.765 ∗∗∗ 0.277 0.326 ∗∗∗
[0.009] [0.011] [1.016] [0.0212] [0.068] [0.24] [0.278] 
Control Variables 
Empratio 0.00408 ∗∗∗ 0.0047 ∗∗∗ 0.0116 ∗∗∗ 0.00011 0.020 ∗∗∗ −0.0025 0.0566 −0.0021 
[0.000544] [0.000551] [0.0012] [0.0006] [0.0015] [0.0021] [0.0064] [0.001] 
Age 0.00199 −0.0285 0.0916 −0.0776 0.412 ∗∗∗ −0.0963 −0.036 ∗∗∗ 0.0012 
[0.0781] [0.0782] [0.134] [0.0789] [0.156] [0.0196] [0.0054] [0.009] 
Constant 0.640 1.402 0.261 3.423 −3.338 ∗∗ 0.238 1.965 ∗∗∗ 0.244 
[1.942] [1.940] [1.226] [2.887] [1.606] [0.313] [0.222] [0.371] 
Observations 31,166 31,202 13,417 17,785 9256 4161 11,156 5206 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F statistics 50.00 48.98 24.85 36.42 31.98 23.11 40.56 29.12 
F test for u_i = 0 84.34 84.69 60.32 119.0 61.20 64.09 97.14 139.1 
R 2 0.198 0.201 0.231 0.247 0.281 0.257 0.263 0.256 
R 2 _adjusted 0.178 0.181 0.201 0.227 0.247 0.217 0.240 0.225 
Notes: 1) Standard errors in brackets 2) ∗ p < .10 ∗∗ p < .05 ∗∗∗ p < .01. 3) The dependent variable is log Tobin’s q, and models are estimated with Fixed Effects Estimation by adding time and company-fixed 
effects.4) The primary sector is raw materials which cover agriculture and mining industry. The secondary sector is manufacturing sector including EGW and construction sectors. The tertiary sector is service 
industries including wholesale, retail, transport, telecom, finance, real estate, professional and scientific activities, education, health, and culture. 
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Table 4 
The impact of debt and IC on the MV of UK firms: 3 sector model in pre- and post-crisis. 
Sectors Primary Secondary Tertiary All sectors 
(1) All (2) Pre (3) Post (4) All (5) Pre (6) Post (7) All (8) Pre (9) Post (10) Pre (11) Post 
RnD intensity −0.296 ∗ −0.320 ∗ −0.434 0.196 ∗∗∗ 0.402 ∗∗∗ −0.361 ∗∗∗ 0.063 ∗∗∗ 0.111 ∗∗∗ 0.0417 ∗ 0.102 ∗∗∗ −0.0290 ∗
[0.177] [0.169] [0.668] [0.0308] [0.0398] [0.0488] [0.0107] [0.0246] [0.0213] [0.0140] [0.0151] 
Patent intensity 1.196 0.579 0.761 0.290 ∗∗∗ 0.372 ∗∗ 1.084 ∗∗∗ 0.196 ∗∗∗ −2.326 ∗∗∗ 0.737 ∗∗∗ 0.847 ∗∗∗ 0.838 ∗∗∗
[2.195] [0.208] [0.783] [0.111] [0.161] [0.238] [0.0603] [0.410] [0.155] [0.105] [0.105] 
TM intensity 2.22 ∗∗∗ 0.470 ∗∗∗ 0.130 ∗∗ −0.0371 0.871 ∗∗∗ 0.0102 −0.0235 −0.169 ∗∗ −0.481 ∗∗∗ −0.0638 −0.242 ∗∗∗
[3.978] [0.099] [0.616] [0.0717] [0.166] [0.0861] [0.0296] [0.0807] [0.0817] [0.0626] [0.0504] 
Advertising intensity 0.109 ∗∗∗ 0.136 ∗∗∗ 0.205 0.054 ∗∗∗ −0.00023 0.0668 ∗∗∗ −0.02 ∗∗∗ −0.0119 ∗∗ 0.0189 ∗ 0.00361 ∗ 0.0503 ∗∗∗
[0.0250] [0.0264] [0.193] [0.00627] [0.008] [0.0153] [0.0001] [0.00560] [0.0103] [0.00242] [0.00707] 
Debtratio 0.226 ∗ 0.567 ∗∗∗ −0.814 ∗ 0.0128 −0.122 0.00125 0.604 ∗∗∗ 0.203 ∗∗∗ −0.377 ∗∗∗ −0.110 ∗∗∗ 0.219 ∗∗∗
[0.134] [0.198] [0.441] [0.0472] [0.0853] [0.0864] [0.0479] [0.0677] [0.145] [0.0336] [0.0562] 
Rndxpatent 0.707 0.354 −0.867 −0.496 ∗∗∗ 0.0781 −2.034 ∗∗∗ −0.013 0.431 ∗∗∗ −0.518 ∗∗∗ −0.232 ∗∗∗ −0.542 ∗∗∗
[0.127] [0.101] [0.090] [0.160] [0.354] [0.716] [0.013] [0.049] [0.0522] [0.0199] [0.0397] 
Debt interactions 
Debtxrndint −0.51 ∗∗∗ −0.480 ∗∗∗ −0.171 ∗∗∗ −0.109 ∗∗∗ −0.485 ∗∗∗ −0.113 −0.02 ∗∗∗ −0.00679 −0.218 ∗∗∗ 0.0316 ∗∗∗ −0.00280 
[0.042] [0.452] [0.355] [0.0377] [0.0865] [0.0889] [0.005] [0.0175] [0.0530] [0.0121] [0.00791] 
Debtxpatent 2.532 −0.734 −0.819 −1.579 ∗∗∗ 0.620 −0.888 −0.0313 1.418 ∗∗∗ −0.678 ∗∗∗ 1.728 ∗∗∗ −0.560 ∗∗∗
[1.444] [0.093] [0.149] [0.380] [1.355] [0.641] [0.0490] [0.340] [0.145] [0.286] [0.101] 
Debtxtmint 1.470 ∗∗ −0.238 ∗∗ −0.203 1.067 ∗ −0.309 ∗∗∗ −1.896 ∗∗ −0.187 ∗∗ 0.189 0.907 ∗∗∗ −0.232 0.537 ∗∗
[0.073] [0.117] [0.261] [0.595] [0.109] [0.829] [0.0879] [0.274] [0.300] [0.228] [0.222] 
Debtxadvertint 0.82 ∗∗∗ 0.731 ∗∗∗ 0.208 ∗∗∗ −0.009 ∗ 0.139 ∗∗∗ 0.0160 0.0056 ∗ 0.021 ∗∗∗ 0.146 ∗∗∗ 0.0166 ∗∗∗ −0.00222 
[0.0716] [0.0743] [0.043] [0.0047] [0.0434] [0.0116] [0.003] [0.004] [0.0356] [0.00231] [0.00489] 
Rndxpatentxdebt −0.297 0.257 0.580 0.205 ∗∗∗ −0.311 0.583 ∗∗∗ 0.0045 −0.54 ∗∗∗ 0.827 ∗∗∗ 0.186 ∗∗∗ 0.797 ∗∗∗
[0.648] [0.438] [0.860] [0.051] [1.104] [0.0932] [0.0118] [0.0597] [0.0670] [0.0174] [0.0525] 
Control Variables 
Emp −0.02 ∗∗∗ −0.033 ∗∗∗ 0.00311 −0.0013 ∗∗ 0.009 −0.0038 ∗∗ 0.02 ∗∗∗ 0.020 ∗∗∗ 0.019 ∗∗∗ 0.0065 ∗∗∗ −0.00149 
[0.005] [0.0104] [0.0107] [0.0006] [0.067] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.002] [0.004] [0.0007] [0.002] 
Age −0.0311 −0.0171 0.0165 −0.023 ∗∗∗ −0.0320 ∗∗∗ 0.0256 ∗∗ −0.0443 0.127 0.0010 0.138 0.0162 
[0.033] [0.0302] [0.0267] [0.005] [0.0066] [0.0112] [0.089] [0.108] [0.017] [0.0950] [0.010] 
Constant 1.230 0.779 −0.744 1.305 ∗∗∗ 1.648 ∗∗∗ −0.691 1.547 −0.861 0.0045 −2.993 −0.333 
[1.243] [1.258] [1.141] [0.201] [0.264] [0.460] [1.231] [1.825] [0.336] [2.489] [0.306] 
Observations 1865 1047 818 13007 8725 4282 10617 6350 4267 21,835 9367 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F statistics 6.163 4.954 12.70 27.80 25.73 48.38 22.17 28.88 14.05 57.76 47.24 
F test for u_i = 0 110.6 95.82 72.30 124.3 109.6 139.4 74.70 66.19 70.76 76.19 94.66 
R 2 0.362 0.366 0.504 0.254 0.245 0.410 0.252 0.339 0.169 0.227 0.236 
R 2 _adjusted 0.293 0.278 0.450 0.235 0.222 0.384 0.225 0.309 0.129 0.205 0.207 
Notes: 1) Standard errors in brackets 2) ∗ p < .10 ∗∗ p < .05 ∗∗∗ p < .01. 3) The dependent variable is log Tobin’s q, and models are estimated with Fixed Effects Estimation including firm and time fixed 
effects. 4)The primary sector is raw materials which cover agriculture and mining industry. The secondary sector is manufacturing sector including EGW and construction sectors. The tertiary sector is 
service industries including wholesale, retail, transport, telecom, finance, real estate, professional and scientific activities, education, health, and culture. 5) Columns 1,4,7 represent all firms in three sectors, 
respectively. Columns 2-3 show primary sector before and after the crisis. Columns 5–6 for secondary and columns 7–8 for the tertiary sector. Columns 10-11 show before and after the crisis for all firms. 
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Table 5 
The impact of debt and IC on the MV of UK firms: alternative sectoral classification. 
Tobin’s Q High Tech& KIS Low Tech& KIS 
(1) All (2) Pre (3) Post (4) All (5) Pre (6) Post 
L.logtobinsq 0.805 ∗∗∗ 0.837 ∗∗∗ 0.673 ∗∗∗ 0.883 ∗∗∗ 0.888 ∗∗∗ 0.703 ∗∗∗
[0.000203] [0.000721] [0.00221] [0.00665] [0.00642] [0.0141] 
RnDintensity 0.0772 ∗∗∗ 0.0908 ∗∗∗ 0.141 ∗∗∗ −0.0101 −0.00346 0.697 ∗∗∗
[0.000806] [0.00347] [0.00746] [0.0431] [0.0484] [0.135] 
Patent_intensity 0.214 ∗∗∗ 1.047 ∗∗∗ 0.250 ∗∗∗ 0.189 −2.614 ∗∗∗ −0.872 
[0.00215] [0.0181] [0.0130] [0.348] [0.330] [1.349] 
TM_intensity −0.149 ∗∗∗ −0.167 ∗∗∗ −0.155 ∗∗∗ 0.0680 0.272 −2.042 ∗∗
[0.00100] [0.0149] [0.0160] [0.165] [0.474] [0.884] 
Advertising_intensity 0.0227 ∗∗∗ 0.0249 ∗∗∗ 0.00650 ∗∗ 0.0488 ∗∗ 0.0420 ∗∗ 0.0562 
[0.000148] [0.000577] [0.00264] [0.0205] [0.0191] [0.0444] 
Debtratio 0.232 ∗∗∗ 0.162 ∗∗∗ 0.0740 ∗∗∗ 0.172 ∗∗∗ 0.141 ∗∗ 0.0995 
[0.00224] [0.0102] [0.0219] [0.0643] [0.0614] [0.186] 
Rndxpatent −0.0201 ∗∗∗ −0.207 ∗∗∗ −0.0240 ∗∗∗ 0.203 1.834 ∗∗∗ 2.791 
[0.000451] [0.00462] [0.00272] [1.222] [1.594] [2.613] 
Debt interactions 
Debtxrndint 0.0226 ∗∗∗ 0.0177 ∗∗∗ 0.00745 0.223 0.160 −0.124 
[0.000410] [0.00233] [0.0145] [0.310] [0.248] [0.657] 
Debtxpatent −0.0812 ∗∗∗ −0.881 ∗∗∗ −0.458 ∗∗∗ 2.911 2.552 ∗∗∗ 0.544 
[0.00179] [0.0199] [0.0253] [2.813] [1.805] [4.683] 
Debtxadvertint −0.00893 ∗∗∗ −0.00797 ∗∗∗ −0.00924 ∗∗∗ −0.0658 −0.0571 0.327 ∗
[0.000105] [0.000390] [0.00229] [0.0609] [0.0433] [0.201] 
Debtxtmint −0.0322 ∗∗∗ 0.145 ∗∗∗ 0.931 ∗∗∗ −7.612 −1.320 ∗∗∗ 5.868 
[0.00154] [0.0265] [0.0589] [5.126] [2.699] [6.786] 
Rndxpatentxdebt 0.0749 ∗∗∗ 0.164 ∗∗∗ 0.0983 ∗∗∗ 1.146 −1.075 ∗∗∗ −8.596 ∗
[0.0039] [0.00490] [0.00564] [1.533] [7.587] [4.861] 
Control Variables 
Emp 0.00322 ∗∗∗ 0.00434 ∗∗∗ 0.00474 ∗∗∗ −0.000594 0.0000861 −0.0189 ∗∗∗
[0.0000321] [0.000166] [0.000335] [0.00396] [0.00246] [0.00452] 
Age −0.000699 ∗∗∗ −0.000610 ∗∗∗ 0.00525 ∗∗∗ −0.00115 −0.00170 −0.00131 ∗∗
[0.0000201] [0.0000629] [0.000183] [0.00287] [0.00109] [0.000638] 
Constant −0.0438 ∗∗∗ −0.0768 ∗∗∗ −0.179 ∗∗∗ −0.0180 0.0127 0.0194 
[0.000532] [0.00194] [0.00629] [0.113] [0.0407] [0.0213] 
Observations 24721 17659 7062 5829 4249 1580 
p > Wald (Chi2) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
R 2 adj 0.885 0.834 0.785 0.929 0.928 0.810 
Sargan 480.1 390.5 202.2 68.96 62.12 49.40 
p > Sargan (Chi2) 0.9955 0.245 0.2749 0.999 0.998 0.998 
AR (1) −5.6313 ∗∗∗ −6.011 ∗∗∗ −2.383 ∗∗∗ −4.591 ∗∗∗ −4.570 ∗∗∗ −3.049 ∗∗∗
AR (2) 0.2348 −0.505 0.677 0.204 −0.670 −1.045 
Instruments 579 387 206 439 435 122 
Notes: 1) Standard errors in brackets 2) ∗ p < .10 ∗∗ p < .05 ∗∗∗ p < .01. 3) The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q and the models are 
estimated by using Dynamic System GMM estimations. 4) The sectors are constructed using Eurostat indicators on High-Tech and Knowledge-intensive 
sectors based on NACE level 2 classifications. KIS represents Knowledge Intensive Service Sectors. 5) In our estimations, as we have only level 1 serial 
correlation, we limited our maximum lagged variables to be instrumented to lag 3. Also, the following diagnostic tests ensured the validity of the GMM 
estimations: Sargan test, Arellano-Bond test and Wald Chi-Square test. 6) Pre and post indicate before and after the Global Financial Crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 patenting, and advertising activities, while trademarking indirectly boosts the performance of the firms with high debt.
Indebted firms in the secondary sector may also get higher market valuation if they jointly focus on R&D and patenting.
Patents and R&D also have positive impact on market values in the tertiary sector, while advertising indirectly improves
firm performance. 
Moreover, in Table 4 , columns 2-3 show primary sector, columns 5-6 the secondary and columns 7-8 show the tertiary
sector, while Columns 10-11 look at the pre- and post-crisis at an aggregate level. All UK firms in general benefit from R&D
and patents in the pre-crisis. Also, increasing the advertising intensity for high-leverage firms helps boost market values.
Also, R&D only contributes to better performance in debt-intensive firms if supported by patent, in the post-crisis. Firms in
the secondary sector directly benefit from R&D, patent, and trademark in the pre-crisis period, and indirectly from market-
ing if the firm has high debt. In the post-crisis period, firms in the secondary sector directly benefit from marketing and
patenting. Focusing on R&D alone does not improve stock performance following the crisis, in the secondary sector firms.
In the tertiary sector, R&D directly provides better performance whereas patenting only provides better performance in the
tertiary sector if it is jointly done with R&D. 
4.2.1. The impact of debt and IC on valuation in pre-and post-crisis periods: an alternative sectoral classification 
Initially, we used the three-sector classifications to analyze the impact of debt and IC in the market valuation of UK firms.
Here, we carry out our investigations further by introducing an alternative sectoral classification. We check whether an al-
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Table 6 
The impact of debt and IC on the valuation uncertainty of UK firms. 
Dept variable: Stdev_Q (1) (2) (3) Pre-crisis (4) Post-Crisis 
Stdev_Q (t-1) 0.393 
∗∗∗ 0.388 ∗∗∗ 0.714 ∗∗∗ 0.117 ∗∗∗
[0.00003] [0.00005] [0.00002] [0.00008] 
RnDintensity −0.315 ∗∗∗ −0.404 ∗∗∗ −0.247 ∗∗∗ −1.401 ∗∗∗
[0.0009] [0.0016] [0.00115] [0.0318] 
Patent_intensity −0.148 ∗∗∗ −1.764 ∗∗∗ −0.679 ∗∗∗ −6.153 ∗∗∗
[0.0008] [0.0142] [0.0084] [0.197] 
TM_intensity 0.251 ∗∗∗ 0.324 ∗∗∗ −0.205 ∗∗∗ 1.049 ∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.0031] [0.00642] [0.0449] 
Advertising_intensity 0.0343 ∗∗∗ 0.0146 ∗∗∗ 0.0164 ∗∗∗ 0.0339 ∗∗∗
[0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0003] [0.0093] 
Debtratio −0.331 ∗∗∗ v0.859 ∗∗∗ −0.490 ∗∗∗ −2.003 ∗∗∗
[0.0013] [0.007] [0.006] [0.086] 
Rndxpatent 0.761 ∗∗∗ 0.463 ∗∗∗ 5.949 ∗∗∗
[0.00317] [0.00189] [0.537] 
Debt Interactions 
Debtxrndint −0.0847 ∗∗∗ 0.418 ∗∗∗ −0.607 ∗∗∗
[0.0117] [0.0101] [0.137] 
Debtxpatent −2.264 ∗∗∗ −0.722 −4.385 ∗∗∗
[0.128] [0.707] [0.195] 
Debtxadvertint 0.171 ∗∗∗ 0.0360 ∗∗∗ 0.790 ∗∗∗
[0.00283] [0.00224] [0.0633] 
Debtxtmint 1.900 ∗∗∗ −4.316 ∗∗∗ 2.262 ∗∗∗
[0.0212] [0.177] [0.361] 
Rndxpatentxdebt 3.544 ∗∗∗ 2.530 ∗∗∗ −1.833 ∗
[0.109] [3.414] [1.602] 
Control Variables 
Emp −0.00512 ∗∗∗ −0.00506 ∗∗∗ −0.00804 ∗∗∗ −0.00302 ∗∗∗
[0.002] [0.005] [0.008] [0.004] 
Age −0.00652 ∗∗∗ −0.00611 ∗∗∗ −0.00673 ∗∗∗ −0.0114 ∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.001] [0.007] [0.005] 
Constant 0.401 ∗∗∗ 0.515 ∗∗∗ 0.423 ∗∗∗ 1.055 ∗∗∗
[0.0003] [0.0011] [0.0005] [0.008] 
Observations 7357 7357 5233 1593 
p > Wald (Chi 2 ) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
R 2 adj 0.0809 0.091 0.0748 0.11 
Sargan 240.1 229.5 195.4 75.62 
p > Sargan (Chi 2 ) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AR (1) −1.241 −1.240 −2.109 ∗∗∗ −1.018 
AR (2) 0.0636 0.0457 −1.579 0.320 
Instruments 357 621 470 206 
Notes: 1) Standard errors in brackets 2) ∗ p < .10 ∗∗ p < .05 ∗∗∗ p < .01. 3) The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q and the models 
are estimated by using Dynamic System GMM estimation methodology. 4) In our estimations, as we have only order 1 serial correlation, we limited our 
maximum lagged variables to be instrumented to lag 3. 5) The diagnostic tests ensured the validity of the GMM estimations: Sargan test, Arellano-Bond 
test and Wald Chi-Square test. 6) Pre- and post-crisis indicate before and after the Global Financial Crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ternative classification of sectors (see studies such as Pieri et al. (2018) and Mallick and Sousa (2017) ) would yield similar
results with our initial three-sector classification. For instance, Pieri et al. (2018) had ICT sectors and classified firms such
as high-tech and low-tech, high-knowledge intensive, and low-knowledge intensive, whereas Mallick and Sousa (2017) had
manufacturing sector and classified firms as production-intensive, supplier-dominated and science-based manufacturing. The
sectors are constructed using Eurostat indicators on High-Tech and Knowledge-intensive sectors based on NACE level 2 clas-
sifications. 
On the other hand, in our study, we look at the UK market at an aggregate level by including all sectors. As our measure
of IC is not limited to R&D or patents, but also covers trademark and advertising assets, being in the service sector does not
mean that they are less-knowledge intensive per se . All firms producing knowledge are embedded in IC stocks. Therefore,
parallel to the classifications in Pieri et al. (2018) and Mallick and Sousa (2017) , we divided our sample into two sectors.
The first sector covers the companies in high tech manufacturing and high knowledge-intensive service sectors (KIS), and
the second sector covers low-tech and low knowledge-intensive service sectors (KIS). Table 5 below presents our two-sector
results. Columns 1–3 focus on high-technology intensive manufacturing and knowledge-intensive service sectors, whereas
columns 4–6 covers low-technology intensive manufacturing and knowledge-intensive service sectors. Results show that
high-tech sectors benefit from R&D and patenting both directly and indirectly through their joint impact, regardless of their
debt-intensity, and low-tech sectors benefit from marketing and advertising. Also, in the post-crisis period, low-tech sectors
with high debt can benefit from marketing and trademarks. 
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Table 7 
The impact of debt and IC on the valuation uncertainty: A sectoral classification. 
Stdev_Q High Tech& KIS Low Tech& KIS 
(1) All (2) Pre (3) Post (4) All (5) Pre (6) Post 
Stdev_Q (t-1) 0.291 
∗∗∗ 0.383 ∗∗∗ 0.168 ∗∗∗ 0.279 ∗∗∗ 0.617 ∗∗∗ 0.114 ∗∗∗
[0.00129] [0.0008] [0.0081] [0.027] [0.034] [0.042] 
RnDintensity −0.287 ∗∗ 0.0320 −0.819 ∗∗∗ −1.057 ∗ −0.423 −2.295 
[0.136] [0.035] [0.273] [0.575] [0.541] [1.482] 
Patent_intensity 1.724 ∗ −5.663 ∗∗∗ 1.882 7.611 ∗∗∗ 4.348 1.887 
[1.008] [0.660] [5.755] [2.520] [327.2] [0.511] 
TM_intensity 0.474 0.875 ∗ −0.611 −9.904 −2.891 ∗∗ −1.043 
[0.315] [0.451] [0.796] [9.918] [14.04] [1.800] 
Advertising_intensity 0.148 ∗∗∗ 0.0697 ∗∗∗ 0.306 ∗∗∗ 0.389 ∗ 0.191 1.173 ∗
[0.036] [0.0121] [0.097] [0.231] [0.201] [0.613] 
Debtratio 1.636 ∗∗ 0.312 ∗∗ 1.889 1.515 0.00432 8.074 ∗∗
[0.706] [0.132] [1.498] [1.132] [0.897] [3.431] 
Rndxpatent −0.445 ∗∗ 0.929 ∗∗∗ −4.072 ∗ −7.054 ∗∗∗ −3.1346 −2.7827 ∗
[0.217] [0.101] [12.60] [2.361] [4.304] [4.2299] 
Debt interactions 
Debtxrndint 0.958 −1.447 ∗∗∗ 4.325 ∗∗∗ 4.124 ∗ 2.421 6.411 
[0.942] [0.315] [0.835] [2.162] [1.744] [7.821] 
Debtxpatent −3.450 3.750 ∗∗∗ −6.987 −6.931 −2.9140 3.4197 
[4.808] [0.395] [29.61] [1391.8] [1.798] [2.9352] 
Debtxadvertint −0.671 ∗ 0.449 ∗∗∗ −1.914 ∗∗∗ −1.318 ∗∗ −0.754 −4.754 ∗∗
[0.369] [0.111] [0.383] [0.670] [0.494] [2.231] 
Debtxtmint −1.293 ∗∗∗ −2.564 ∗∗∗ −1.752 0.9621 1.532 1.032 
[0.427] [0.421] [7.147] [0.6438] [2.436] [1.037] 
Rndxpatentxdebt 1.851 ∗∗∗ 4.675 ∗∗∗ 2.895 2.114 ∗ 3.8127 2.100 
[0.437] [0.489] [0.444] [1.136] [3.666] [2.0743] 
Control Variables 
Emp 0.0025 ∗ −0.0081 ∗∗∗ 0.0049 −0.0111 0.0083 −0.125 
[0.0013] [0.001] [0.007] [0.037] [0.0301] [0.137] 
Age 0.00140 0.0106 ∗∗∗ −0.011 ∗∗∗ −0.0038 −0.0014 −0.00131 
[0.0012] [0.0004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.008] 
Constant −2.534 ∗∗∗ −2.375 ∗∗∗ −2.434 ∗∗∗ −2.585 ∗∗∗ −1.248 ∗∗∗ −4.165 ∗∗∗
[0.0531] [0.0206] [0.186] [0.285] [0.272] [0.844] 
Observations 5642 4140 1118 1556 998 558 
p > Wald(chi2) 0.00001 0.00001 0.0001 0.00001 0.0001 0.0194 
R 2 adj 0.145 0.126 0.0336 0.100 0.677 0.207 
Sargan 187.6 163.6 55.61 342.5 336.9 135.1 
p > Sargan (Chi2) 0.9999 0.8904 0.9996 0.0798 0.0112 0.9939 
AR (1) −2.164 ∗∗ −1.827 ∗ −1.120 −1.2014 −1.185 −1.193 
AR (2) −1.392 −1.062 −0.312 −0.504 −0.669 −0.453 
Instruments 475 202 110 322 295 194 
Notes: 1) Standard errors in brackets 2) ∗ p < .10 ∗∗ p < .05 ∗∗∗ p < .01. 3) The dependent variable is the standard deviation of Tobin’s Q and models are esti- 
mated by using Dynamic System GMM estimation methodology. The standard deviation of Tobin’s Q is an indication of valuation uncertainty. 4) The sectors 
are constructed using Eurostat indicators on High-Tech and Knowledge-intensive sectors based on NACE level 2 classifications. KIS represents Knowledge 
Intensive Service Sectors. 5) In our estimations, as we have only order 1 serial correlation, we limited our maximum lagged variables to be instrumented 
to lag 3. Also, the following diagnostic tests ensured the validity of the GMM estimations: Sargan test, Arellano-Bond test, Wald- Chi-Square test. 6) Pre- 
and post-crisis periods indicate before and after the Global Financial Crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.2.2. The impact of debt and IC on valuation uncertainty of the UK firms in pre- and post-crisis 
According to Guerzoni et al. (2014) and Audretsch et al. (2012) , firms with a greater number of patents can signal ap-
propriability to the market and investors and are more likely to have access to external financing. Both debt and equity
financing play an important role in firm performance as different firms may have different capital structures. Market prices
may fluctuate during the crisis periods; therefore, the role of debt structure and intellectual capital intensities might have
an important role in reducing the uncertainty created during bad times. In Table 6 we test the role of debt and intellectual
capital intensities on valuation uncertainty of the UK firms. Here, the dependent variable Tobin’s Q has been replaced with
the standard deviation of Tobin’s Q, indicated by “stdev_Q” in this table. The standard deviation of Tobin’s Q is an indication
of valuation uncertainty and is calculated using a moving standard deviation over time. We started with first three obser-
vations (1 to 3), followed by observations 2 to 4, 3 to 5 etc., which helped us to have a time series, with only losing 2
observations overall. 
The first column of Table 6 shows the benchmark results. Column 2 introduces the debt and intellectual capital inter-
action terms and suggests that R&D, patent and debt intensities reduce the price uncertainty both directly and indirectly.
Column 3 shows the uncertainty equation in the pre-crisis period, whereas column 4 estimates the post-crisis period. In
the pre-crisis period, R&D, patent, trademark directly reduce the valuation uncertainty while patent and trademarks have
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 an indirect role in reducing the valuation uncertainty of high-debt firms. In the post-crisis period, R&D, patents and debt
reduce the uncertainty both directly and indirectly. As opposed to the pre-crisis period, trademarking is less effective in
reducing the valuation uncertainty for high debt firms in the post-crisis period. Therefore, firms, especially high-debt ones
should focus on patenting and R&D activities that help alleviate the valuation uncertainty in the post-crisis period. 
Similarly, in Table 7 , we carry out further investigations by checking whether sectoral classification (see studies such as
( Pieri et al., 2018 ) and ( Mallick and Sousa, 2017 )) matters in reducing valuation uncertainty of the UK firms in the pre- and
post-crisis periods. Parallel to Pieri et al., 2018 ), the first sector covers the companies in high tech manufacturing and high
knowledge-intensive service sectors (KIS), and the second sector covers low-tech and low knowledge-intensive service sec-
tors (KIS). Columns 1-3 focus on high-technology intensive manufacturing and knowledge-intensive service sectors, whereas
columns 4-6 cover low-technology intensive manufacturing and knowledge-intensive service sectors. Both sectors are ana-
lyzed for the whole sample, in the pre- and the post-crisis periods, respectively. We find that focusing on patenting and R&D
may help to reduce the valuation uncertainty of high-tech firms, whereas for the low-tech firms, trademark and advertising
contribute to a reduction in valuation uncertainty. 
4.3. Robustness checks 
4.3.1. The impact of debt and IC on MV of the UK firms: 3-sector model with firm sizes 
As the main empirical investigations have shown, firms with different sizes benefit differently from IC. Therefore, in
our first robustness check, we carried our investigation further by separating the sample by sectors and firm size. We find
that SMEs in the primary sector get better valuation by focusing on advertising activities, while larger firms in the primaryTable 8 
Robustness 1: The impact of debt and IC on MV of the UK firms: 3-sector model with different firm sizes 
All sectors Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary 
ALL FIRMS (1) SME (2) SME (3) SME (4) LARGE (5) LARGE (6) LARGE 
RnDintensity −0.558 0.489 ∗∗∗ 0.036 ∗∗∗ −0.972 −0.26 ∗∗∗ 0.512 ∗∗∗
[0.541] [0.0600] [0.0137] [0.815] [0.0407] [0.0457] 
Patent_intensity - 1.322 ∗∗∗ 0.273 ∗∗∗ 0.377 ∗∗∗ −1.951 ∗∗∗ −2.207 ∗∗
[0.183] [0.0682] [0.0134] [0.302] [0.886] 
TM_intensity - 0.167 ∗ −0.14 ∗∗∗ 0.163 ∗∗∗ 0.521 ∗ −0.442 ∗∗
[0.0955] [0.035] [0.241] [0.273] [0.213] 
Advertising_intensity 1.226 0.0290 ∗∗ −0.0058 0.0373 0.038 ∗∗∗ −0.05 ∗∗∗
[0.993] [0.0125] [0.0057] [0.0445] [0.0109] [0.0076] 
Debtratio 0.456 ∗∗∗ 0.237 ∗∗ 0.688 ∗∗∗ −0.155 −0.112 0.546 ∗∗∗
[0.106] [0.114] [0.064] [0.130] [0.0702] [0.0862] 
Rndxpatent - −0.250 ∗∗∗ −0.029 ∗∗ −0.212 ∗∗ 0.484 ∗∗∗ 0.306 
[0.372] [0.015] [0.0848] [0.114] [0.024] 
Debt interactions 
Debtxrndint 0.746 −0.435 ∗∗∗ −0.0092 −0.66 ∗∗∗ 0.791 ∗∗∗ −1.49 ∗∗∗
[0.951] [0.150] [0.0062] [0.184] [0.0662] [0.105] 
Debtxpatent - −0.349 ∗∗∗ −0.106 ∗ −0.33 ∗∗∗ 0.117 ∗∗∗ 0.264 ∗
[0.722] [0.0549] [0.106] [0.017] [0.136] 
Debtxtmint −0.733 −0.0363 0.152 ∗∗∗ 0.730 ∗∗∗ −0.129 ∗∗∗
[0.933] [0.0976] [0.0447] [0.15] [0.031] 
Debtxadvertint −0.583 0.0164 −0.0073 ∗ 0.171 −0.263 ∗∗∗ 0.232 ∗∗∗
[1.749] [0.0135] [0.0038] [0.108] [0.043] [0.0319] 
Rndxpatentxdebt - 0.791 ∗∗∗ 0.0226 ∗ 0.197 ∗∗∗ −8.237 ∗∗∗ −0.763 
[1.19] [0.013] [0.053] [1.225] [0.537] 
Control Variables 
Empratio 0.0371 −0.008 0.025 ∗∗∗ −0.0147 0.002 0.006 ∗∗
[0.0325] [0.018] [0.002] [0.042] [0.069] [0.0025] 
Age −0.32 ∗∗∗ v0.096 ∗∗∗ 0.123 −0.013 −0.016 ∗∗∗ −0.124 
[0.0924] [0.013] [0.141] [0.020] [0.0045] [0.0799] 
Constant 3.945 ∗∗ 2.211 ∗∗∗ 0.423 0.618 1.28 ∗∗∗ 3.641 ∗
[1.742] [0.279] [0.990] [0.869] [0.227] [1.937] 
Observations 285 4321 6464 1580 8686 4153 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F statistics 3.376 12.86 14.33 6.455 22.06 14.97 
F test for u_i = 0 17.99 77.01 66.24 108.5 144.4 105.0 
R 2 0.795 0.328 0.267 0.416 0.289 0.373 
R 2 _adjusted 0.548 0.290 0.228 0.343 0.266 0.337 
Notes: 1) Standard errors in brackets 2) ∗ p < .10 ∗∗ p < .05 ∗∗∗ p < .01. 3) The dependent variable is log Tobin’s q, and models are estimated with Fixed 
Effects Estimation by adding time and company-fixed effects. 4) The primary sector is raw materials which cover agriculture and mining industry. The 
secondary sector is manufacturing sector including EGW and construction sectors. The tertiary sector is service industries including wholesale, retail, 
transport, telecom, finance, real estate, professional and scientific activities, education, health, and culture. 5) SMEs are companies with less than or equal 
to 250 employees. 
9
3
2
 
I.
 N
em
lio
g
lu
 a
n
d
 S.K
.
 M
a
llick
 /
 Jo
u
rn
a
l
 o
f
 E
co
n
o
m
ic
 B
eh
a
v
io
r
 a
n
d
 O
rg
a
n
iza
tio
n
 17
7
 (2
0
2
0
)
 9
13
–
9
4
0
 
Table 9 
Robustness 2: The impact of debt and IC on MV of the UK firms: 3-sector model with different firm sizes in pre-and post-crisis. 
Primary Sector Secondary Sector Tertiary Sector Primary Sector Secondary Sector Tertiary Sector 
SME SME SME SME SME SME Large Large Large Large Large Large 
(1) 
Pre-Crisis 
(2) 
Post-Crisis 
(3) 
Pre-Crisis 
(4) 
Post-Crisis 
(5) 
Pre-Crisis 
(6) 
Post-Crisis 
(9) 
Pre-Crisis 
(10) 
Post-Crisis 
(11) 
Pre-Crisis 
(12) 
Post-Crisis 
(13) 
Pre-Crisis 
(14) 
Post-Crisis 
R&Dintensity . . 0.649 ∗∗∗ −0.814 ∗∗∗ 0.0626 ∗ 0.0530 ∗∗ −0.536 ∗∗∗ 0.531 0.0291 −0.370 ∗∗∗ 0.566 ∗∗∗ −0.268 ∗∗
. . [0.0798] [0.233] [0.0320] [0.0264] [0.119] [0.366] [0.0744] [0.0633] [0.0708] [0.133] 
Patent intensity . . 0.823 ∗∗∗ 1.297 ∗∗∗ −0.558 0.852 ∗∗∗ -0.705 0.189 ∗∗∗ 0.324 ∗∗∗ 0.435 ∗∗∗ 1.013 ∗∗∗ 0.571 
. . [0.232] [0.278] [0.471] [0.188] [0.119] [0.425] [0.082] [0.119] [0.298] [1.501] 
TM intensity . . 0.977 ∗∗∗ 0.211 ∗∗ −0.364 ∗∗∗ −0.658 ∗∗∗ 0.346 ∗∗∗ 0.6340 ∗∗ 0.271 ∗∗∗ −0.553 ∗∗∗ 0.0348 0.130 
. . [0.225] [0.102] [0.0841] [0.113] [0.575] [0.310] [0.050] [0.057] [0.500] [0.746] 
Advertising intensity −0.683 −0.128 ∗∗∗ −0.0350 ∗∗ 0.127 ∗∗∗ 0.0286 ∗∗∗ 0.00844 0.441 ∗∗∗ −0.339 ∗∗∗ 0.00409 0.118 ∗∗∗ −0.0741 ∗∗∗ 0.155 ∗∗∗
[0.727] [0.031] [0.0167] [0.0298] [0.00840] [0.0129] [0.0722] [0.114] [0.012] [0.0418] [0.009] [0.0518] 
Debtratio −0.00625 . −1.090 ∗∗∗ 0.390 ∗∗ 0.488 ∗∗∗ −0.442 ∗∗ 0.502 ∗∗ −0.942 ∗∗∗ 0.402 ∗∗∗ 0.0531 0.263 ∗∗ −0.179 
[1.715] . [0.234] [0.177] [0.0883] [0.214] [0.206] [0.250] [0.0877] [0.140] [0.111] [0.208] 
Rndxpatent . . −0.396 −0.503 ∗∗∗ 2.413 ∗∗∗ −0.548 ∗∗∗ 1.408 ∗∗ −2.108 ∗∗∗ −2.545 2.304 −0.646 ∗∗∗ −0.111 
. . [0.488] [0.902] [0.582] [0.0628] [0.595] [0.487] [3.389] [2.435] [0.127] [3.348] 
Debt interactions 
Debtxrndint . . −2.700 ∗∗∗ 0.511 ∗∗∗ 0.0157 −0.183 ∗∗∗ 0.289 ∗∗∗ 0.288 0.446 ∗∗∗ −1.022 ∗∗∗ −1.631 ∗∗∗ −0.518 
. . [0.342] [0.165] [0.0208] [0.0689] [0.415] [0.232] [0.0925] [0.371] [0.129] [0.548] 
Debtxpatent . . −0.709 ∗∗∗ 0.601 ∗∗ 1.55 ∗∗∗ −0.834 ∗∗∗ −0.309 −0.314 ∗∗∗ v0.353 −0.279 ∗∗∗ v0.147 ∗∗∗ 0.516 ∗∗∗
. . [0.249] [0.27] [0.440] [0.178] [0.539] [0.778] [0.455] [0.309] [0.435] [0.161] 
Debtxtmint . . 0.415 ∗∗ −0.290 ∗∗ 0.661 ∗∗ 1.278 ∗∗∗ −0.327 ∗∗∗ −0.147 0.670 −0.357 ∗ −0.189 ∗∗∗ −0.277 ∗∗∗
. . [0.194] [1.191] [0.280] [0.373] [0.715] [0.134] [4.205] [0.215] [0.542] [0.627] 
Debtxadvertint 0.499 0.211 ∗∗∗ 0.757 ∗∗∗ −0.0537 ∗∗∗ −0.003 0.124 ∗∗∗ v0.559 ∗∗∗ 0.426 ∗ −0.376 ∗∗∗ 0.322 ∗∗∗ 0.277 ∗∗∗ −0.244 ∗
[0.624] [0.442] [0.106] [0.0184] [0.004] [0.0468] [0.174] [0.233] [0.0537] [0.105] [0.0357] [0.147] 
rndxpatentxdebt . . 2.577 ∗ −0.508 −3.184 ∗∗∗ 0.869 ∗∗∗ −2.725 1.749 ∗∗∗ −30.37 13.66 ∗∗∗ 0.713 ∗∗∗ −0.160 ∗∗
. . [1.522] [4.284] [0.694] [0.0806] [2.594] [0.449] [20.78] [4.427] [0.182] [0.625] 
Control Variables 
Emp 0.564 0.265 ∗∗∗ −0.0401 −0.0094 ∗∗∗ 0.0133 ∗∗∗ 0.0335 ∗∗∗ −0.0235 ∗∗∗ 0.0821 ∗∗∗ 0.0986 −0.0047 ∗∗ 0.0123 ∗∗∗ 0.0153 ∗∗∗
[0.587] [0.0474] [0.0306] [0.0025] [0.0024] [0.0667] [0.00625] [0.0148] [0.068] [0.0021] [0.0036] [0.00402] 
Age −0.544 ∗∗∗ 0.0522 −0.0990 ∗∗∗ −0.0361 0.445 ∗∗∗ 0.0131 −0.0127 0.00549 −0.0380 ∗∗∗ 0.0257 ∗∗ −0.171 ∗ −0.0125 
[0.156] [0.100] [0.0180] [0.0224] [0.154] [0.0272] [0.0177] [0.0153] [0.00715] [0.0117] [0.104] [0.0153] 
Constant 10.78 ∗∗∗ 3.551 2.340 ∗∗∗ 0.975 ∗ −4.212 ∗∗ −0.250 0.360 −0.189 2.191 ∗∗∗ −0.973 ∗ 5.173 ∗ 0.429 
[3.365] [2.417] [0.351] [0.509] [1.813] [0.341] [0.826] [0.738] [0.350] [0.589] [2.765] [0.465] 
Observations 165 120 2919 1402 3825 2639 882 698 5806 2880 2525 1628 
F statistics 1.545 11.13 9.323 27.65 22.89 9.609 9.057 11.86 23.65 27.81 17.34 5.757 
F test for u_i = 0 1.77e −14 −2.9e −14 64.63 98.48 72.16 54.43 107.9 117.4 141.4 118.8 73.50 112.1 
R 2 0.706 0.895 0.267 0.557 0.408 0.186 0.561 0.530 0.311 0.375 0.442 0.183 
R 2 adjusted 0.235 0.809 0.219 0.522 0.369 0.134 0.490 0.473 0.286 0.342 0.404 0.126 
Notes: 1) Standard errors in brackets 2) ∗ p < .10 ∗∗ p < .05 ∗∗∗ p < .01. 3) The dependent variable is log Tobin’s q, and models are estimated with Fixed Effects Estimation, company and time fixed effects are 
included but not reported in the table for the sake of brevity.4) The primary sector is raw materials which cover agriculture and mining industry. The secondary sector is manufacturing sector including EGW 
and construction. The tertiary sector is service industries including wholesale, retail, transport, telecom, finance, real estate, professional and scientific activities, education, health, and culture. 5) Columns 
1-6 shows pre- and post-crisis estimations for SMEs in primary, secondary and tertiary sectors respectively. Columns 7-8 show pre- and post-crisis estimations for all SMEs. Columns 9-14 show pre- and 
post-crisis estimations for large firms in primary, secondary and tertiary sectors, respectively. Columns 15-16 show pre- and post-crisis estimations for large firms. 
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Table 10 
Robustness 3: The impact of debt and IC on the MV of high-debt firms in pre-and post-crisis. 
High Debt Firms Technology Intensive Firms (R&D and Patents) Knowledge Intensive Firms (TM and Adv) All periods Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
RnD intensity 0.18 ∗∗∗ 0.113 ∗∗∗ 0.096 ∗∗∗ 0.064 ∗∗∗ −0.044 ∗∗∗ 0.211 ∗∗∗ 0.159 ∗∗
[0.008] [0.009] [0.0132] [0.0139] [0.0122] [0.0310] [0.0699] 
Patent intensity 0.0116 0.146 ∗∗∗ 4.302 ∗∗∗ 1.442 ∗∗∗
[0.0111] [0.0430] [1.180] [0.400] 
TM intensity 0.08 ∗∗∗ 0.09 ∗∗∗ 0.08 ∗∗∗ −0.0122 −0.347 ∗∗∗ 0.466 ∗∗∗
[0.0128] [0.0120] [0.0128] [0.0351] [0.0877] [0.167] 
Advertising intensity 0.03 ∗∗∗ 0.0583 ∗∗∗ 0.0199 ∗∗∗ 0.106 ∗∗∗
[0.0009] [0.00642] [0.0072] [0.0410] 
Debtratio 0.36 ∗∗∗ 0.33 ∗∗∗ 0.345 ∗∗∗ 0.57 ∗∗∗ 0.47 ∗∗∗ 0.439 ∗∗∗ 0.200 ∗∗∗ −0.213 
[0.0206] [0.0261] [0.0278] [0.007] [0.009] [0.0283] [0.0384] [0.144] 
Rndxpatent −0.034 ∗∗∗ −0.257 −1.55 ∗∗∗
[0.00967] [1.463] [0.306] 
Debt interactions 
Debtxrndint 0.0189 ∗ 0.0308 ∗∗∗ 0.0181 ∗∗∗ −0.0182 −0.41 ∗∗∗
[0.0105] [0.011] [0.00551] [0.017] [0.0719] 
Debtxpatent −0.168 ∗∗∗ −7.438 ∗∗∗ −0.485 ∗∗
[0.0451] [1.672] [0.239] 
Debtxtmint 0.231 ∗∗ 0.524 ∗∗∗ −0.98 ∗∗∗
[0.106] [0.179] [0.353] 
Debtxadvertint −0.0211 ∗∗∗ −0.0049 0.247 ∗∗∗
[0.00340] [0.0036] [0.047] 
Rndxpatentxdebt 0.06 ∗∗∗ 0.0322 ∗∗∗ −0.0274 1.262 ∗∗∗
[0.015] [0.0103] [1.818] [0.449] 
Control Variables 
Emp ratio 0.0059 ∗∗∗ 0.0082 ∗∗∗ −0.05 ∗∗∗
[0.00145] [0.0015] [0.00555] 
Age -0.036 ∗∗∗ 0.0021 −0.0159 
[0.0051] [0.006] [0.0139] 
Constant 0.49 ∗∗∗ 0.40 ∗∗∗ 0.414 ∗∗∗ 0.411 ∗∗∗ 0.379 ∗∗∗ 0.169 ∗∗∗ 0.154 ∗∗∗ 1.595 ∗∗∗ 1.134 0.291 
[0.032] [0.0315] [0.0321] [0.032] [0.018] [0.017] [0.020] [0.201] [0.831] [0.594] 
Observations 10213 10,213 10,213 10,213 46,873 46,873 34,840 8181 5557 2624 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F statistics 16.67 19.14 19.03 19.27 36.85 86.53 75.85 17.86 21.79 15.18 
F test for u_i = 0 122.3 111.7 110.5 108.5 181.2 167.2 139.0 91.82 99.70 77.40 
R 2 0.197 0.221 0.221 0.226 0.104 0.216 0.247 0.262 0.307 0.267 
R 2 _adjusted 0.163 0.187 0.188 0.192 0.0797 0.194 0.224 0.225 0.269 0.218 
Notes: 1) Standard errors in brackets 2) ∗ p < .10 ∗∗ p < .05 ∗∗∗ p < .01. 3) The dependent variable is log Tobin’s q, and models are estimated with Fixed Effects Estimation, company and time fixed effects are 
included. 4) Columns 1–4 show high debt firms that are doing R&D and patenting, in other words, “technology-intensive firms”, whereas columns 5–7 show firms with Trademarking (TM) and advertising 
activities (Knowledge Intensive firms). Column 8 shows high debt firms for all periods whereas columns 9–10 show pre- and post-crisis estimations. 
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 sector benefit from patenting and trademarking directly. In columns 4–6, for larger firms with leverage, the trademarking
activities drive market valuation in primary and secondary sectors. Also, large firms in the secondary sector benefit from
R&D and patents, along with debt. Additionally, financially unconstrained SMEs in the secondary sector benefit from all
types of intellectual capital directly, and also from R&D and patenting activities. Large firms, however, only directly ben-
efit from trademarking and marketing activities, and indirectly benefit from patenting, R&D and trademarks with higher
leverage. Higher R&D activities and patents have a direct positive impact on market values of SMEs in the tertiary sector,
while high debt has an indirect positive impact on R&D if jointly undertaken with patenting. However, large firms in the
tertiary sector only directly benefit from higher R&D activities, and indirectly benefit from patenting and advertising with
leverage. 
4.3.2. The impact of debt and IC on MV of the UK firms: sectoral and size heterogeneity in pre-and post-crisis periods 
As a second robustness check, by carrying the investigation further in Table 8 , we analyze the impact of innovation and
debt on SME and large firms across-3 sectors both during pre- and post-crisis periods. Table 9 , Columns 1–6 show the
SMEs in three sectors during both periods. Columns 9–14 we investigated the large firms in three sectors in both periods
separately. In the disaggregated sample (column 1–6), SMEs in the primary sector only have marketing intensities regardless
of debt in both periods. SMEs in the secondary sector benefit from R&D and patents individually but not jointly during pre-
crisis. However, if SMEs in the secondary sector use leverage, focusing on R&D or patents alone is not enough, as they only
jointly contribute to firm performance. Additionally, high leveraged SMEs in the secondary sector could also benefit from
trademarks, focusing on marketing intensity. Also, firms in the primary sector (columns 9–10) are mainly large firms who
benefit from advertising and trademarks in pre-crisis, whereas in-the-post crisis high debt-dependent firms can perform
better if focused on advertising. Also, following the crisis, firms can benefit from patenting alone but only jointly with
R&D if they have high debt. Large firms in the secondary sector benefit from patents and trademarks pre-crisis (column
11) and advertising and patenting in the post-crisis period (column 12). Also, in the post-crisis period, large firms with
leverage can focus on advertising to boost company performance. But they perform patent and R&D jointly if they are
leverage-intensive. The tertiary sector, however (column 13) benefits from both R&D and patents individually pre-crisis but
not jointly. Conversely, firms with high leverage can benefit from R&D and patenting if they are conducted together. On the
other hand, large firms in the tertiary sector following the crisis (column 14) can benefit only from patenting if they have
high leverage. 
4.3.3. The impact of debt and IC on MV of high-debt firms in pre-and post-crisis periods 
As the third robustness check, we examined the impact of IC on only high-debt firms. Firms with patenting and R&D
activities are labelled as technology-intensive (in Columns 1–4), whereas the firms with a greater focus on trademark
and advertising are denoted as knowledge-intensive (Columns 5–7). Column 8 shows the full sample of high-debt firms
whereas columns 9–10 show pre- and post-crisis estimations. Columns 1–7 of Table 10 introduce IC and debt elements
individually and found that high-debt firms focusing only on one of the innovation activities could achieve higher mar-
ket valuation, as well as patenting along with R&D. High debt firms also benefit from trademarks and advertising with
debt. Results in Column 8 suggest that patent and advertising increase the valuation of high-debt firms. The indirect im-
pact of patents with high debt is only positive if jointly done by R&D. Columns 9–10 reveal that, in the post-crisis period,
all types of intellectual capital tend to be beneficial for high-debt firms. Also, as well as individually being beneficial for
firm performance, the joint impact of patent and R&D activities also contributes to firm performance in the post-crisis
period. 
5. Conclusion 
Exploring the size and sectoral heterogeneity, this paper investigates the impact of innovation on firms’ valuation
and its uncertainty, using quarterly data from 20 0 0–2014 from UK firms traded in London Stock Exchange. Our pre-
liminary analysis pointed to the existence of a structural break, making us undertake the analysis before and af-
ter the global financial crisis. Overall, we find that IC intensive firms outperform the non-IC ones in the post-crisis
period. 
Benchmark regression results suggest that higher R&D, patent, and advertising intensity along with debt boost market
valuation while trademarks only boost the market valuation of large firms. Firms in the post-crisis period benefit from
intellectual assets differently as opposed to pre-crisis. For instance, high-debt firms can boost stock market performance by
focusing jointly on R&D and patents. We also found that although leverage distorts market valuation of large UK firms, the
impact is positive for SMEs that are innovation intensive. Moreover, manufacturing and service sector firms benefit from
R&D and patenting activities with high leverage during the post-crisis period, but not in the pre-crisis. Firms that are high
IC intensive tend to have higher market valuation and less valuation uncertainty, regardless of their debt structure during
bad times. 
Moreover, this paper also explores the impact of sectoral heterogeneity on valuation and its uncertainty using two dif-
ferent sectoral classifications. The first classification is the 3-sector classification, namely primary, secondary and tertiary
sectors. The primary and secondary sectors benefit from patenting, trademarking, and advertising activities. Firms in the
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 secondary sector get higher market valuation if they jointly focus on R&D and patenting along with debt. Patents and R&D
activities also contribute to higher market values in the tertiary sector. Using the second type of sectoral classification –
high-technology and high KIS sectors with low-technology and low KIS sectors –we find that high-tech manufacturing firms
benefit from patenting and R&D irrespective of their debt-intensity, whereas low- KIS firms benefit from trademark and
advertising in general, in the post-crisis period. 
Besides, we investigated the role of debt and intellectual capital intensities on valuation uncertainty of the UK firms.
In the pre-crisis period, R&D, patent, trademark directly reduce uncertainty while patent and trademarks have an indi-
rect role in reducing the valuation uncertainty of high-debt firms. In the post-crisis period, R&D, patents and debt re-
duce the valuation uncertainty. Therefore, firms, especially high-debt firms should focus on patenting and R&D activities
that help alleviate the valuation uncertainty in the post-crisis period. It is also found that high-tech manufacturing firms
can reduce their valuation uncertainty in the post-crisis period by focusing on R&D and patenting. In the same man-
ner, high-KIS firms can overcome the valuation uncertainty by focusing on trademarking and advertising in the post-crisis
period. 
Additionally, we conducted three robustness checks to ensure the credibility of our results. First, we sub-divided the
sample further by separating firms in each of the three sectors as SMEs and large companies. SMEs in the primary sector
get a better valuation by focusing on advertising assets, while financially less constrained (higher debt) SMEs in the sec-
ondary and tertiary sector benefit from joint R&D and patenting activities. Similarly, in the second robustness check, we
again explore the SMEs and large firms at a sectoral level, but by adding the temporal variation (i.e. pre- and post-crisis
periods), our results remain consistent. Furthermore, in the final robustness check, by investigating the subsample of only
high-debt firms, we found that patents and R&D intensive firms benefit more than non-IC intensive firms in the post-crisis
period. 
In summary, we find that UK firms in general, benefit from patents during both pre- and post-crisis periods. As op-
posed to the previous literature, this paper finds that SMEs indeed have higher debt ratios and are more innovation-
intensive than large firms, benefiting SMEs even in the post-crisis period. Finally, high-tech firms achieve better val-
uation and are able to reduce their valuation uncertainty by generating patents and investing in R&D irrespective
of their debt level, whereas low-tech firms benefit from investing in trademarks and advertising in improving their
performance. 
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Appendix A-Table 1 Additional Descriptive Statistics 
Panel 1 (Appendix A) reveals that high patent-intensive firms have better Tobin’s Q. Panel 2 points out that the tertiary
sector has the highest Tobin’s Q as well as the highest debt ratio. The primary sector has the lowest IC intensive sector. 
Panel 1: Descriptive Statistics based on Patent intensities 
Variable High Patent Firms Low Patent Firms 
Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
tobinsq 3620 2.47 3.69 0.32 46.91 133918 1.54 1.94 0.04 49.81 
RnDintensity 6259 0.8401 1.136 0 8.184 46350 0.553 1.4877 0 34.836 
Advertising_intensity 7696 2.785 2.938 0.085 35.184 129842 1.954 4.993 0 95.917 
Patent_intensity 7696 0.8033 2.407 0.0273 28.169 129842 0.000223 0.00174 0 0.0272 
TM_intensity 7696 0.259 1.033 0 14.084 129842 0.0138 0.179 0 12.195 
Emp_ratio 8396 7.73 19.76 0.103 470.59 129142 10.15 51.75 0.002 5200 
Age 55015 21.60 28 0 157 82523 22.08 29.37 0 154 
Debt ratio 4361 0.4742 0.55 0.018 5.26 133177 0.5460 0.79 0 31.07 
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 Panel 2: Descriptive statistics based on sectors 
Sectors Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Tobinsq 12254 1.39 1.27 0.094 34.18 30720 1.4 1.49 0.2 44.3 66343 1.65 2.32 0.042 49.8 
RnDintensity 3300 0.13 0.46 0 6.11 18869 0.42 1.25 0 34.8 20816 0.85 1.83 0 25.7 
Advertising_ 
Intensity 
21965 1.32 3.65 0 0.83 34880 1.9 3.71 0 90.9 80693 2.1 5.21 0 95.9 
Patent_ 
Intensity 
21965 0.0003 0.01 0 0.83 34880 0.05 0.43 0 13.8 80693 0.04 0.62 0 28.2 
TM_intensity 21965 0.002 0.04 0 1.36 34880 0.04 0.16 0 3.53 80693 0.03 0.34 0 14.1 
Emp_ratio 25424 8.86 40.38 0.01 1491.5 44575 8.45 28.9 0.01 2734 67539 10.4 35.72 0.004 1535.2 
Age 31450 15.94 27.44 0 130 38887 30.8 34.1 0 141 67201 15.7 24.10 0 157 
Debtratio 14213 0.40 0.35 0.008 9.40 34195 0.51 0.46 0.007 12.27 79456 0.59 0.99 0.001 31.07 
Appendix B-Table 2 Correlation Matrix 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) RnDintensity 1 
(2) Patent_intensity 0.235 1 
(3) TM_intensity 0.214 0.118 1 
(4) Advertising_intens 0.662 0.048 0.163 1 
(5) Emp_ratio 0.200 0.086 0.043 0.226 1 
(6) Age 0.193 0.017 0.045 0.515 0.023 1 
(7) Debtratio -0.178 -0.017 -0.007 -0.035 -0.025 -0.0146 1 
Notes: All correlations are significant at 5% level. 
Appendix C-Figure 3 Histograms of Debt Ratio 
. Note: Distribution of debt ratio. The first histogram presents the number of firms that have less than 5 as their debt ratio (500%). The second histogram
presents the number of firms that have more than 5 as their debt ratio (500%). The third graph represents a scatter plot of debt ratio across Tobin’s Q. 
For the sake of visibility, Figure 3 (Appendix C) presents histograms of debt ratio in two parts. The first histogram
presents the number of firms that have less than 5 as their debt ratio (500%), while the second one demonstrates the
firms with more than “5” as their debt ratio (500%). It is observable from the figures that the majority of the firms in the
UK have debt ratios between 0-1; however, there are extreme cases with firms’ debt ratio at 30. 
Appendix D-Figure 4 scatter plots of innovation and debt ratio 
We disaggregate the data further in Fig. 4 which aims to demonstrate the indirect impact of innovation variables on debt.
The firms here are classified as high and low debt firms (based on mean debt) in first 4 scatter plots whereas the last two
indicates all firms. When the full sample is used in the investigation (in the last two plots), the impact of debt increases
with an increase in patent and R&D intensities. However, when we separate the sample as high and low debt firms, the
impact of both R&D and patent intensity is positive in high debt firms, whereas the impact is less significant and declining
(R&D and patent respectively) in low debt firms. 
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 . Notes: Scatter plot of innovation against the debt ratio. Above figures present scatter plots of the innovation variables and debt ratio. These plots aim to
show the indirect impact of innovation variables on debt. The firms here are classified as high and low debt firms in first 4 scatter plots whereas the
last two indicates all firms. If we look at all sample, in the last two tables the impact of debt increases with an increase in patent and R&D intensities.
However, when we separate the sample as high and low debt firms the impact of both R&D and patent intensity is positive in high debt firms, whereas
the impact is less significant and declining (R&D and patent respectively) in low debt firms. All tables indicate average firm-level R&D, patent and debt
ratios. The overall impact seems also to be positive in all sample in the last two graphs. 
Appendix E- Estimating the structural break in Tobin’s Q in the UK 
We run four separate Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests by allowing for break-in intercept and specifying lag selection (3 lags)
as per Zivot-Andrews after which the series remain stationary. 
Minimum t-statistic -9.789 at 2007 (obs 8) 
Critical values: 1%: −5.34 5%: −4.80 10%: −4.58 
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 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Interpolated Dickey-Fuller 
Test Statistics 1% Critical Value 5% Critical Value 10% Critical Value 
Only mean Z(t) −1.209 −3.75 −3 −2.63 
MacKinnon approximate 
p-value for Z(t) 
0.5349 
Mean with 3 lags Z(t) 1.209 −3.75 −3 −2.63 
MacKinnon approximate 
p-value for Z(t) 
0.6697 
Mean with 3 lags and drift Z(t) −1.209 −3.143 −1.943 −1.44 
MacKinnon approximate 
p-value for Z(t) 
0.1361 
Mean with 3 lags and trend Z(t) −1.885 −4.38 −3.6 −3.24 
MacKinnon approximate 
p-value for Z(t) 
0.6625 
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